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Abstract
This Comments argues that the Europol Convention will be an effective and workable mech-
anism for countering international crime within the European Union, and therefore should be rat-
ified by Member States. Part I discusses the theoretical basis for international police cooperation,
and analyzes the agreements and initiatives among EU Member States which predate Europol.
Part II examines the obstacles that have delayed the completion of the Europol Convention, as
well as the particular aspets of the Convention that may delay or prevent its ratification. Part III
argues that existing EU Member States’ agreements permit Europol to contribute substantially to
EU police investigations and prosecutions.
EUROPOL: THE CULMINATION OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION'S INTERNATIONAL
POLICE COOPERATION EFFORTS
Francis R Monaco*
INTRODUCTION
The formation of a single financial market within the Euro-
pean Union' ("EU") entailed the abolition of border controls
between all Member States2 and created new opportunities for
international crime.3 Recognizing that international crime
could only be countered through international police coopera-
tion,4 the Council of the European Union recently finalized the
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7,1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719,31 I.L.M. 247 [herein-
after TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmnd. 5179-I)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC Off'I Pub. Off. 1987). Until 1995, the twelve EU Member States were
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. TEU, supra, pmbl. OJ. C. 224/1, at 2
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 725-26. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden
became Member States of the European Union. Sweden, Finland and AustriaJoin Euro-
pean Union, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 2, 1995, at A8. The enlarged Union does not include
Norway, which rejected membership in the Union in November 1994. John Harton,
Vote in Norway Blocks Joining Europe's Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al.
2. SEA, supra note 1, art. 13, O.J. L 169/1, at 7 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 747.
Article 13 states:
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establish-
ing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992.... The
internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accord-
ance with the provisions of [the Treaty of Rome].
Id. art. 13, O.J. L 169/1, at 7 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 747. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text (explaining European Union comprised of fifteen Member States).
3. See Joel S. Solomon, Forming a More Secure Union: The Growing Problem of Organ-
ized Crime in Europe as a Challenge to National Sovereignty, 13 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 623, 623
(1995) (noting that crime within European Union is growing at exponential rate since
loosening of internal border controls); Jennifer Parmelee, European Unity: An Offer the
Mafia Can't Refise, WASH. PosT, May 19, 1989, at F1 [hereinafter European Unity: An
Offer the Mafia Can't Refuzsel (discussing increased opportunity for money laundering
resulting from unification).
4. See Scott Carlson & Bruce Zagaris, International Cooperation in Criminal Matters:
Western Europe's International Approach to International Crime, 15 NOVA L. Rav. 551, 552-33
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text of a convention establishing the European Police Office
("Europol"). 5 The Europol Convention represents the Euro-
pean Union's latest attempt to counter international crime
through international police cooperation.6
The European Union's formation of a single financial mar-
ket removed obstacles to the free movement of goods, services,
and workers among Member States.7 The Single European Act
("SEA"), focusing primarily on European economic unity, did
not directly address the impact of unification on Member States'
substantive criminal law and internal security." While Member
States have benefitted from a free market economy, therefore,
the removal of institutional barriers has created new opportuni-
ties for illegal activity, such as illicit narcotics trafficking, money
laundering, 9 and organized crime." Furthermore, the final lift-
(1991) (noting that international cooperation is powerful tool for countering interna-
tional crime).
5. Convention Based on Article K3 of the Treaty of European Union, on the Es-
tablishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention),July 20, 1995, Europol
54, Rev. 5, Annex (1995), opened for signatureJuly 26, 1995 [hereinafter Europol Conven-
tion] (on file with Fordham International Law Journal); see Europol Convention Signed but
Still to Be Ratified, Agence France Presse, July 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Allwld File (noting Europol Convention completed); EU Member States Discreetly
Proceed with SigningEuropol Convention, Agence Europe, July 27, 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allwld File (noting Council of Ministers finalized text of Europol Con-
vention).
6. TEU, supra note 1, art. K.1(9), Oj. C 224/1, at97 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
735. The TEU requires that:
Member States shall regard ... as [a] matter[ ] of common interest ... (9)
police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism,
unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, in-
cluding if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection
with the organization of a Union-wide system for exchanging information
within a European Police Office (Europol).
Id.
7. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing creation of internal market
with European Union).
8. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 558.
9. See Scott E. Mortman, Note, Putting Starch in European Efforts to Combat Money
Laundering, 60 FoRDam L. REv. S429, S429 (1992).
By transferring the proceeds derived from criminal activities, such as drug traf-
ficking or terrorism, through financial and credit institutions in different Eu-
ropean nations, criminals can make these proceeds appear to be the result of
legitimate business activities. This process of using legitimate institutions to
conceal the source of illegitimate gains is commonly known as money launder-
ing.
Id. (citations omitted).
10. See Padrig Flynn, An Address to the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Trans-
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ing of restrictions on capital movements within the European
Union permitted criminals to manipulate the international fi-
nancial system and launder the proceeds of criminal activity."
Lifting these barriers allowed drug traffickers to move their op-
erations and capital from country to country more easily,12 and
to disguise the sources of their proceeds within the integrated
financial system.' 3
The European Union is responding to the increased oppor-
tunities for criminal activity, created by the single financial mar-
ket, by constructing international police cooperation initia-
tives. 4 Although Member States have not yet ratified the Euro-
pol Convention, an embryonic version, known as the Europol
Drugs Unit ("EDU"), is currently in force. 6 The EDU has been
instrumental in coordinating numerous successful drug seizures
within the European Union. 7
This Comment argues that the Europol Convention will be
an effective and workable mechanism for countering interna-
tional crime within the European Union, and therefore should
be ratified by Member States. Part I discusses the theoretical ba-
sis for international police cooperation, and analyzes the agree-
national Crime, European Commission Press Release, Nov. 21 1994, at 2, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (discussing danger organized crime posed to Euro-
pean Community).
11. EC to Take Action Against Money Laundering, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv.,
Jan. 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File.
12. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 555.
13. Mortman, supra note 9, at S429; see European Unity: An Offer the Mafia Can't
Refuse, supra note 3, at F1 (discussing opportunity unification of Europe presents for
money laundering).
14. See Europol Convention, supra note 5, pmbl., 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex. The
Europol Convention states that "there is a need for progress in solidarity and co-opera-
tion between the Member States of the European Union, particularly through an im-
provement in police cooperation between Member States." Id.
15. See EU: Criticism of Cannes Focuses on Eurrpol, Reuters Textline, June 30, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Alilwid File (explaining that Europol Convention is
complete but requires ratification by EU Member States).
16. Joint Action of 10 March 1995 Adopted by the Council on the Basis of Article
K.3 of the Treaty on European Union Concerning the Europol Drugs Unit, O.J. L 62/1
(1995) [hereinafter Council's Joint Action]. The Council's Joint Action replaced the
June 2, 1993, Ministerial Agreement on the establishment of the Europol Drugs Unit.
Id. art. 8, O.J. L 62/1, at 3 (1995).
17. See Tyler Marshall, Jurgen Storbech, LA. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at 5 (discussing
successful international crime investigation operations); Europol Spans Frontiers in War on
Crime, FIN. TIMES, May 19, 1994, at 2 (reporting that Europol Drugs Unit ("EDU") in-
volvement in numerous international criminal investigations).
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ments and initiatives among EU Member States which predate
Europol. Part I also examines the EDU's current activities. Fi-
nally, Part I presents the provisions of the current version of the
Europol Convention. Part II examines the obstacles that have
delayed the completion of the Europol Convention, as well as
the particular aspects of the Convention that may delay or pre-
vent its ratification. Part III argues that existing EU Member
States' agreements permit Europol to contribute substantially to
EU police investigations and prosecutions. This Comment con-
cludes that Member States should reconsider the Convention's
provisions on data protection and citizens' rights to privacy, in
order to ensure that the Europol Convention strikes the neces-
sary balance between facilitating effective law enforcement and
protecting the rights of citizens.
I. INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION WITHIN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EDU'S CURRENT ACTIVITIES
Incidents of transnational crime, such as drug trafficking,
money laundering, and illegal arms sales, have become particu-
larly acute in Europe. 8 Independent domestic law enforcement
organizations have been ineffective in countering such crime. 9
EU Member States, recognizing the need for international coop-
eration,20 engage in global initiatives, such as anti-drug traffick-
ing conventions 2' and the International Criminal Police Organi-
zation ("Interpol") .22 Member States have also constructed re-
18. See Monica den Boer, Paper Presented at Cyprus Police Academy Seminar 3 (Dec.
1994) (copy on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (noting European law
enforcement organizations' belief that abolition of EU border controls will provide
criminals with increased mobility and opportunity); Rory Watson, Combating Drug Traf-
ficking Across the Single Market, BRrr. MED. J., Mar. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwid File (discussing recent efforts within European Union to combat grow-
ing drug epidemic).
19. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 557-59 (noting limited influence of domes-
tic criminal justice institutions in combatting crime against Member States' interests);
den Boer, supra note 18, at 1. "Territorial restrictions caused by jurisdictional fragmentation
[were seen as] a handicap in the fight against international criminality. Criminals
could escape prosecution by crossing [borders]. Definitions of crime varied between
states and no proper extradition agreements were available." Id.
20. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 552.
21. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 1927), 28
I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter Vienna U.N. Drug Convention].
22. INTERPOL, THE CONSTITUTION AND GENERAL REGULATIONS OF THE ICPO-IN.
TERPOL (1956) [hereinafter INTERPOL CONSTITUTION]. See generally, MALCOLM ANDER-
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gional initiatives23 intended to counter international drug
trafficking and money laundering. 24 Member States also have
established regional intergovernmental organizations to respond
to the effects of international crime.2 5  Based upon informal,
nonbinding international agreements, rather than formal trea-
ties, organizations such as the Pompidou Group 26 and the Trevi
Group 27 operate outside the framework of EU institutions. 28
The SEA's abolition of internal borders, in conjunction with the
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on Political Union 29 ("Maas-
tricht Treaty" or "Maastrict"), created the impetus for more for-
mal and sophisticated cooperation among EU Member States.30
Consequently, Member States established the Schengen Conven-
tion,3 and Europol's predecessor, the EDU.32
SON, POLICING THE WORLD, INTERPOL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOP-
ERATION (1989) (discussing history and activities of Interpol).
23. See den Boer, supra note 18, at 4-6 (discussing EU regional initiatives); see gener-
ally POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES (Malcolm Anderson & Monica den Boer
eds., 1994) (discussing background and evolution of European international police co-
operation).
24. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds
from Crime, Nov. 8,1990, Europ. T.S. No. 141, 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991) [hereinafter ELC];
Council Directive No. 91/308/EEC, O.J. L 166/77 (1991) [hereinafter EC Money
Laundering Directive]. The TEU states: "A directive shall be binding, as to the result to
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the
national authorities the choice of form and methods." TEU, supra note 1, art. 189, O.J.
C 224/1, at 65 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693-94.
25. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 554-55.
26. See id. at 565 (noting that Pompidou Group was formed in 1971 to examine
problems of drug trafficking and abuse within European Union).
27. See Julian J.E. Schutte, The European Market of 1993: Test for a Regional Model of
Supernational Criminal Justice or of Interregional Cooperation in Criminal Law, 3 CRIM. L.F.
55, 75-76 (1991) (noting that Trevi Group was formed in 1975 to provide forum for
Member States to discuss common police and national security concerns).
28. See Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 554-55 (discussing emergence of infor-
mal regimes to counter international crime).
29. TEU, supra note 1, art. Kl(9), OJ. C 224/1, at97 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
735 (enumerating police cooperation as matter of common interest to Member States).
30. de Boer, supra note 18, at 3, 8.
31. Schengen Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French Republic on the
Gradual Abolition of Controls at the Common Frontiers, June 14, 1985, 30 I.L.M. 68,
73. Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of June 14, 1985 on the Gradual
Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders Among Belgium, France, Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M 84 [herein-
after Schengen Convention].
32. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing EDU).
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A. An Overview of the Institutional Framework of the
European Union
The European Union consists of four main institutions. 33
The Council, acting through its Ministers, *3 is the primary legis-
lative and decision-making body.35 Each Member State holds
the Presidency of the Council for a six month term. 36 The Maas-
tricht Treaty 7 created the Council of Ministers of Justice and
Home Affairs.38  1
The Commission 9 serves as an executive body that imple-
ments and enforces EU legislation. 4° The Commission also initi-
ates EU policy and initiates legislation to the Council. 41  The
Commission consists of EU civil servants who represent the gen-
eral interests of the European Union, rather than a particular
Member State.4' As such, while the members of the Commission
must be citizens of the European Union, and they must operate
independently from any Member States' influence, 43 the Euro-
pean Parliament may review and make recommendations to the
legislative proposals initiated by the Commission.44 The Euro-
33. DAVID MEDHURST, A BRIEF AND PRACTIcAL GUIDE TO EC LAw 17 (1994) (ex-
plaining that four main institutions of European Union include: European Parliament,
Commission, European Court of Justice, and Council of Ministers).
34. Id. at 18.
35. A.G. TOTH, THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 137-38
(1990) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EC LAW]; see generally MEDHURST, supra note 33,
at 18 (stating that Council "is as near as the Community comes to a legislative body").
36. ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EC LAw, supra note 35, at 136.
37. TEU, supra note 1, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719.
38. TEU, supra note 1, arts. K1-.9, O.J. C 224/1, at 97-98 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 735-38. "The Treaties do not specify which member of a Government
should be delegated to the Council. This depends on the particular subject-matter to
be discussed... " ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EC LAw, supra note 35, at 135.
39. ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EC LAw, supra note 35, at 70.
40. Id.
41. Id. In most cases, the Council may not act upon its own initiative, but must act
on a proposal from the Commission. Id. at 72.
42. MEDHURST, supra note 33, at 20.
43. ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EC LAw, supra note 35, at 66'
44. MEDHURST, supra note 33, at 17-18. The Maastricht Treaty has strengthened
Parliament's role in the legislative process in three respects:
[T]he establishment of a new "negative assent" procedure, widely and not
wholly accurately described as the "co-decision procedure", the upgrading of
parliamentary participation, generally from consultation to co-operation, for
decision-making in certain areas, and the conferral of consultation and infor-
mation rights in new areas of Community or Union jurisdiction. Parliament
may also request the Commission to take legislative initiatives.
Kieran St Clair Bradley, "Better Rusty Than Missin"?: The Institutional Reforms of the Maas-
EUROPOL
pean Court of Justice interprets EU legislation. 45
The European Council is closely associated' with the Coun-
cil of Ministers. 47 The European Council is comprised of Mem-
ber States' heads of state and the President of the Commission.'
Unlike the Council of Ministers, the European Council acts as a
guiding body and is not formally involved in legislation.49
B. The Theoretical Underpinnings of European Police Cooperation
In order to produce information, evidence, and ultimately,
the criminal, criminal investigations remaining solely within the
borders of one nation must operate within the constraints of
that nation's political and legal system.50 Two potential obstacles
confront domestic law enforcement. 1 First, disharmony and
conflict between a nation's multiple layers of government such
as disagreements between federal and state officials, can impede
rapid response to crime.52 Second, legal' tensions may exist, in-
volving issues such as the proper balance between a citizen's civil
liberties and the government's need to obtain information.53
Global interdependence, however, is a defining characteris-
tic of the modern world,54 and, increasingly, criminal activity
does not recognize national boundaries.55 Crime often arises in
the, context of international networks, operating beyond the
tricht Treaty and the European Parliament, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 193,
194 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994) (citations omitted).
45. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EC LAw, supra note 35, at 211-17 (discussing role of Eu-
ropean Court of Justice).
46. See MEDHURST, supra note 33, at 19. "The European Council is not the same as
the Council of Ministers but can be regarded as an extension of the latter." 'Id.
47. Donald Macrae, Institutional and Decision-Making Changes, in LEGAL ISSUES OF
THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 171, 171 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement
of Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 37, 44 (1990).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Bruce Zagaris & Elizabeth Kingma, Asset Forfeiture International and Foreign Law:
An Emerging Regime, 5 EMORY INT'L L. Rxv. 445, 453 (1991). The territorial state, the
traditional source of power and major entity in the international forum, "is being sup-
planted by nonterritorial actors, such as intergovernmental organizations, transnational
social movements, and multinational corporations." Id.
55. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 552.
1995]
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control of any single sovereign nation.56 In addition to the
problems encountered in domestic law enforcement, interna-
tional law enforcement must overcome problems that stem from
issues of sovereignty, conflicting legal systems, and political con-
flict between governments. 57 For example, it is not uncommon
for a nation's law enforcement objectives to conflict with its for-
eign policy agenda.58
In an effort to address the impact of European unification
on criminal activity, the European Parliament5 9 established a
Committee of Enquiry ("Committee") in 1985.60 The Commit-
tee considered the Community drug problem by examining the
extent of illicit drug trafficking and drug use within the Euro-
pean Union.6' The results of the Committee's investigation are
contained in its Enquiry Report.62 The Committee's Enquiry Re-
port identified a sharp rise in drug use and an increased
strength of drug traffickers and criminal organizations.6" The
Enquiry Report declared that these criminal organizations
presented an unprecedented threat to the national and interna-
tional social order.64
The Enquiry Report noted that the wide variation among
Member States' criminal laws and penalties impeded interna-
tional police cooperation.65 The Enquiry Report also observed
that criminal cooperation was complicated by the fact that some
Member States follow a common law66 legal system, while others
56. Id.
57. Nadelmann, supra note 50, at 44.
58. Id.
59. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text (discussing role of Parliament in
EU institutional framework).
60. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMITTEE
OF ENQUIRY INTO THE DRUG PROBLEM IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMUNITY 12
(1987) [hereinafter ENQUIRY REPORT].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 44.
66. See HARRY W.JONES ET AL., LEGAL METHOD 5 (1980).
The Anglo-American legal system, unlike the "civil law" system which prevails
with variations in most of the countries of the western world, explicitly recog-
nizes the doctrine of precedent, known also as the principle of stare decisis. It
is the distinctive policy of a "common law" legal system that past judicial deci-
sions are "generally binding" for the disposition of factually similar present
controversies.
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follow a civil code.67 Furthermore, the constitutions of some
countries restrict their ability to apply certain criminal laws be-
yond their borders.6" The Committee's Enquiry Report con-
cluded that Member States' efforts to control international
crime through the traditional model of independent domestic
law enforcement operations were inadequate.6 9
In response to the declining importance of state sovereignty
in addressing the growing strength of international crime, Mem-
ber States have increased their cooperative efforts.7" This in-
creased cooperation produced several formal conventions which
impose binding obligations upon their signatories.7 1 Member
States have also constructed more informal intergovernmental
Id.
67. See A.G. Chloros, Common Law, Civil Law and Socialist Law: Three Leading Legal
Systems of the World, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES 83, 88-89 (Csaba Varga ed., 1992)
[I]f the Codes were different, there was an underlying unity of method and of
concepts. The method was deductive, that is, the process of reasoning was
from general principles to specific cases .... Thus, [in the case of France, for
example], the French judge became a mere administrator with strictly re-
duced powers defined in articles 4 and 5 of the Code civil, judging only individ-
ual disputes between private persons and making no rules for the future.
Id.
68. ENQUIRY REPORT, supra note 60, at 12.
69. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4 at 551-56. Conventional European law en-
forcement techniques are ineffective because the basic institutions on which the citi-
zens of Western democracies rely to "define and improve the criminal process are non-
existent or extremely limited in the international sphere[. D]omestic courts and legis-
latures are, by definition, institutions of limited authority." Id. at 552.
70. See den Boer, supra note 18, at 9 (discussing EU Member States' recognition
that international cooperation is necessary to counter international crime). One com-
mentator has observed the following about police cooperation among Member States:
[P]oliticians - usually least likely to admit an erosion of state sovereignty -
have encouraged this shift by repeatedly stressing the growing impact of trans-
frontier crime. The admission that international crime establishes a genuine
threat to the internal security of EU Member States has forced them to ac-
knowledge the limitations of national law enforcement policies. European po-
lice cooperation, and particularly also the activities of Europol, is beginning to
be based on the principle of subsidiarity: criminal activities that cannot be
effectively combated at a local, regional or national level as a result of inade-
quate resources may increasingly become [the] subject of concerted interna-
tional police cooperation.
Id. at 11. See generally POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, supra note 23 (discuss-
ing international police cooperation initiatives in response to crime within European
Union).
71. See, e.g., Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
26, 28 I.L.M. 493 (establishing internationally recognized drug trafficking offenses and
requiring that such offenses be criminalized under domestic law of signatories); ELC,
supra note 24, Europ. T.S. No. 141, 30 I.L.M. 148 (requiring harmonization of domestic
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organizations72 defined by some commentators as international
regimes. 73 An international regime whose goals are eradicating
drug trafficking and money laundering attempts to reduce the
cost of legal business transactions while increasing the cost of
illegal ones.7 4 Member States benefit from participating in inter-
national regimes by reducing the supply of illicit narcotics, treat-
ing those addicted to narcotics, and diminishing the power of
organized narcotics traffickers.75 The creation of both formal
and informal initiatives demonstrates the shift towards increas-
ing interdependence and cooperation among Member States in
response to escalating international crime.76
drug trafficking and money laundering laws); Schengen Convention, supra note 31, 30
I.L.M. 84 (requiring that signatories cooperate in enforcement of its provisions).
72. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing activities of Pompidou
Group); supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing activities of Trevi Group).
73. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 554. "'[An] International regime' is a spe-
cialized term that emanates from international organization theory in the early 1970s."
Id. (citing R. KEOHANE & J. NYE, TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POUTMS
(1972)). An international regime is a goal-oriented enterprise. Carlson & Zagaris,
supra note 4, at 554. Its participants are driven by mutual concerns to seek the benefits
of "explicit or tacit cooperation.... In fact, international regimes have been defined as
,norms, rules and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue area.'" Id. By
establishing "international procedures, rules and institutions," international regimes
seek to regulate and control certain transnational activities and relations. Id. To ac-
complish these goals, international regimes must be constructed effectively. Id. "To-
day's dynamic global marketplace and world order present new problems for interna-
tional regimes. To combat [drug trafficking and] money laundering effectively, inter-
national regimes must be flexible, stable, able to make decisions, expend resources,
enact laws, provide judicial assistance, and otherwise cooperate in transnational crimi-
nal matters." Id.
74. Bruce Zagaris & Sheila M. Castilla, Constructing an International Financial En-
forceament Subregime: The Implementation of Anti-Money Laundering Policy, 19 BROOV.J. INT'L
L. 871, 880 (1993).
75. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 555. Mutually advantageous international
regimes traditionally derive their benefits from the "soft power diplomacy" of their par-
ticipants. Id. at 552-53. Soft power refers to a nation's ability to "persuade another
[nation] to want what it wants, in contrast to 'hard power,' which involves one nation
ordering another to do what it wants." Id.
76. See id. at 749-50 (discussing trend towards international police cooperation);
den Boer, supra note 18, at 1-13 (discussing rationales behind European police cooper-
ation). One commentator noted:
Most authors consider that there has been a movement from the informal to
the institutional, from diversity to unity: an institutionalised body should logi-
cally take the place of earlier multiple informal groups. This is a 'naturalist'
approach to integration. According to' this approach, the national pattern
should be smoothly integrated into a higher level of development towards
gradually strengthened cooperation.
Didier Bigo, The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivalries in a Newly Developing
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C. EU Member State Participation in Global Efforts to Counter
International Crime
EU Member States participate in several global initiatives to
counter international crime.77 In order to overcome the dispar-
ity among domestic criminal laws and procedures, the Vienna
U.N. Drug Convention78 establishes internationally recognized
offenses for drug trafficking.79 The Vienna U.N. Drug Conven-
tion requires international cooperation in enforcement and
prosecution. 0 EU Member States also participate in Interpol,
which provides a global framework for the exchange of informa-
tion and analysis on criminal activity.81
1. Vienna U.N. Drug Convention
The United Nations' campaign to suppress illicit drug traf-
ficking and related money laundering resulted in the interna-
Area of Police Intervention, in POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 161, 168-69 (Mal-
colm Anderson & Monica den Boer eds., 1994). Another commentator has described
the shift toward international police cooperation with the following schematic:
OLD SYSTEMS
Personal initiative of law enforcement officials
Loose Structure, lack of strategic coordination and functional overlap
Mainly focussed [sic] on the exchange of information
Lack of transparency and control; low status of these issues on the political
agenda
Criminal justice matters belonged to the realm of state sovereignty
NEW SYSTEMS
Bureaucratization as a result of growing input of politicians and senior
officials
Institutionalisation, formallsation and centralisation
Quantitative and qualitative expansion of activities
More emphasis on accountability and transparency of action
Decline of state sovereignty in criminal justice cooperation, visible from
subsidiarty (sic] and changing character of border controls
den Boer, supra note 18, at 12.
77. See, e.g., Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, art. 2(1), 1992 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 26, at 5, 28 I.L.M. at 500 (requiring international police cooperation among its
signatories); INTERPOL CONSTrruTION, supra note 22, art. 2, at 1 (establishing global
network for exchange of information on criminal activity).
78. Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, 28
I.L.M. 493.
79. Id. art. 3, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 5-7, 28 LL.M. at 502; see supra notes 43-
46 and accompanying text (discussing obstacles to international police cooperation cre-
ated by inharmonious domestic criminal laws).
80. Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, art. 7, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26,
at 11-13, 28 I.L.M. at 508.
81. INTERPOL CONSTiTUTION, supra note 22, art. 2, at 1.
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tional community's ratification of the Vienna U.N. Drug Con-
vention.82 The Vienna U.N. Drug Convention establishes inter-
nationally recognized offenses for drug trafficking, and requires
these offenses to be criminalized under the domestic laws of its
signatories."3 Further, the Convention imposes binding obliga-
tions on its signatories to take various cooperative measures re-
garding extradition, 4 confiscation of narcotics and the proceeds
derived therefrom,8 5 mutual legal assistance,86 and cooperation
between law enforcement agencies.87 The Vienna U.N. Drug
Convention also promotes international cooperation through its
drug trafficking prosecutorial framework,88 including the estab-
lishment of uniform aggravating and mitigating factors.89
In addition to its domestic legislation requirement, the Con-
vention also strongly encourages its signatories to enter into bi-
lateral and multilateral agreements to strengthen international
cooperation.9" The Vienna U.N. Drug Convention obligates par-
ties to maintain open lines of communication for the exchange
82. Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, 28
I.L.M. 493. The Convention took effect on November 1, 1990, and has been signed by
over forty countries. Phyllis Solomon, Note, Are Money Launderers All Washed Up in the
Western Hemisphere? The OAS Model Regulations, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 433,
441 (1994). As of April 1993, seventy-two nations had ratified or acceded to the Vienna
Convention. Id.
83. Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, art. 3, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26,
at 5-7, 28 I.L.M. at 500-03.
84. Id. art. 6, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 10-11, 28 I.L.M. at 507. The text of the
Vienna U.N. Drug Convention does not define extradition. See id. arts. 1, 6, 1992 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 4-5, 10-11, 28 I.LM. at 499, 507 (defining Convention terms and
discussing extradition). Elsewhere, extradition is defined as "surrender by one state or
country to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own
territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to
try and punish him, demands the surrender." BLACK'S LAw DicrIoNARv 585 (6th ed.
1990).
85. Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, art. 5, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26,
at 8-10, 28 I.L.M. at 504.
86. Id. art. 7, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 11-13, 28 I.L.M. at 508.
87. Id. art. 9, 1992 Gr. Brit T.S. No. 26, at 13-14, 28 I.L.M. at 511.
88. See id. arts. 3-11, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 3-15, 28 I.L.M. at 500-13 (ad-
dressing drug trafficking prosecutions).
89. Id. art. 3(5)(a)-(h), 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 6-7, 28 I.L.M. at 502.
90. Id. art. 5(4) (g), 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 9, 28 I.L.M. at 506. The Vienna
U.N. Drug Convention calls for its signatories to provide each other with "the widest
measure of mutual assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings."
Id. art. 7, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 11-13, 28 I.L.M. at 508.
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of information 9' and to implement research and training pro-
grams designed to share expertise in preventing proscribed
criminal offenses.92
The Vienna U.N. Drug Convention's criminal forfeiture
provisions also emphasize cooperation among its signatories.93
These provisions require each signatory to enact domestic legis-
lation enabling the signatory to confiscate the proceeds derived
from drug trafficking-related activities.94 The Convention fur-
ther provides that a participating country may not refuse a re-
quest to reveal its bank records on the basis of its own bank se-
crecy laws. 95 Signatories are required to render mutual assist-
ance for the investigation of any of the crimes enumerated
within the Convention, including money laundering.96
91. See id. art. 9(1), 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 13, 28 I.L.M. at 511. Article 9(1)
states:
1. Parties shall co-operate closely with one another, consistent with their re-
spective domestic legal and administrative systems, with a view to enhancing
the effectiveness of law enforcement action to suppress the commission of
[drug production and trafficking] offenses.... They shall ...
(a) Establish and maintain channels of communication between their
competent agencies and services to facilitate the secure and rapid ex-
change of information concerning all aspects of offenses... ;
(b) Co-operate with one another in conducting enquiries, with respect to
[the enumerated] offenses... having an international character ....
Id.
92. Id. art. 9(3), 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 14, 28 I.L.M. at 512.
93. Id. pmbl., 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 3, 28 I.L.M. at 498. One of the Vienna
U.N. Drug Convention's stipulated goals is to "deprive persons engaged in illicit [drug]
traffic of the proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby eliminate their main in-
centive for so doing." Id.
94. Id. art. 5, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 8-10, 28 I.L.M. at 504-06. Signatories
are required "to take such measures as may be necessary to enable the confiscation of:
(a) proceeds derived from [illicit drug-production and trafficking]." Id. art. 5(1) (a),
1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 8, 28 I.L.M. at 504. Signatories are also obligated to "adopt
such measures as may be necessary to enable its competent authorities to identify, trace,
and freeze or seize proceeds, property, [and] instrumentalities... for the purpose of
eventual confiscation." Id. art. 5(2), 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 8, 28 I.L.M. at 504.
95. Id. art. 5(3), 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 8, 28 I.L.M. at 505.
In order to carry out the measures referred to in this article, each Party shall
empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, finan-
cial or commercial records be made available or be seized.' A Party shall not
decline to act under the provisions of this paragraph on the ground of bank
secrecy.
Id.
96. See id. art. 7, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 11-13, 28 I.L.M. at 504 (requiring
signatories to take measures to confiscate "proceeds" derived from activities proscribed
in Vienna U.N. Drug Convention). The Convention defines proceeds as "any property
derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offense
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2. Interpol
Interpol is a network of police agencies located in countries
throughout the world. 7 Rather than an operational organiza-
tion, Interpol is designed to be a communications network.98 In-
terpol provides a global framework for the international ex-
change of information on criminals and criminal activity.9 In-
terpol headquarters' staff comprises law enforcement officials
assigned to temporary duty by their respective governments. 100
Each participating nation maintains its own central bureau to
communicate with Interpol headquarters.'
In the years following its inception, Interpol has become a
forum for the study of European police cooperation. 0 2 In the
late 1970's, Interpol introduced police liaison officers for many
European countries at Interpol headquarters. 0 These police li-
aison officers assist in providing requested inf6rmation concern-
ing their home countries. 04 In 1986, Interpol also addressed
established in accordance with [the terms of the Convention]." Id. art. I (p), 1992 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 4, 28 I.L.M. at 500..
97. Interpol-USNCB: Point of Contact for International Law Enforcement, INTERPOL,
UNITED STATES NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAU, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE.
98. Point of Contact for International Law Enforcement, Interpol, UNITED STATES NA-
TIONAL CENTRAL BUREAU, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE & UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.
99. INTERPOL CONSTITUTION, supra note 22, art. 2, at 1. Article 2 states that In-
terpol's aims are:
(a) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all
criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different
countries and in the spirit of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights";
(b) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to
the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes.
Id.
Since 1923, Interpol has been at the forefront of coordinating international police
investigations and has served as a model for other international organizations. Interpol-
USNCB: Point of Contact for International Law Enforcement, supra note 97. See generally
MALCOLM ANDERSON, POLICING THE WORLD, INTERPOL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL POLICE COOPERATION (1989) (discussing history and activities of Interpol).
100. Nadelmann, supra note 50, at 45. Over 100 governments are affiliated with
Interpol. Id.
101. Id. Interpol headquarters is located in France. Id.
102. Id. at 45. Interpol "serves as a central repository for the collection, transmis-
sion, and analysis of information on transnational criminals. It maintains extensive files
of names, mugshots, fingerprints and other information." Id.
103. Malcolm Anderson, The Agenda for Police Cooperation, in POLICING ACROSS NA-
TIONAL BOUNDARIES 3, 10 (Malcolm Anderson & Monica den Boer eds., 1994).
104. Id.
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the need for a more concentrated effort within Europe10 5 by cre-
ating a European Secretariat 0 within its General Secretariat. 10 7
Despite Interpol's efforts to address the specific needs of the Eu-
ropean Union, however, Interpol's focus remains global. 08
Consequently, commentators view Interpol as an imperfect
mechanism for police cooperation between EU Member
States. 10 9
D. Regional Efforts to Harmonize Domestic Criminal Legislation
In addition to their participation in global efforts to counter
international crime, Member States have also constructed re-
gional initiatives aimed at preventing money laundering and
drug trafficking." 0 As part of this effort, these regional conven-
tions are designed to harmonize Member States' domestic crimi-
nal legislation. 1 ' The Council of Europe's European Launder-
ing Convention" 2  ("ELC") requires EU Member States to
criminalize all money laundering activities' 1 3 and calls for inter-
national cooperation in the enforcement of its provisions."14
105. den Boer, supra note 18, at 2.
106. See id. (discussing creation of Interpol's European Secretariat within its Gen-
eral Secretariat).
107. See INTERPOL CONSTITUTION, supra note 22, art. 26, at 7 (enumerating duties
of General Secretariat). The General Secretariat serves as the central command center
for Interpol's activities. Anderson, supra note 103, at 10.
108. John Benyon et al., Understanding Police Cooperation in Europe: Setting a Frame-
work for Analysis, in POUCING AcRoss NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 56, 57 (Malcolm Anderson
& Monica den Boer eds., 1994).
109. See Nadelmann, supra note 50, at 45 (noting that many law enforcement offi-
cials in Western Europe are frustrated by Interpol's "failure to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances and to quickly integrate new technology advances in crime control and
communications"); den Boer, supra note 18, at 3 (stating that despite creation of Euro-
pean General Secretariat, "Interpol was hampered by its lack of operational powers, its
weak system of accountability and data protection, and its inability to act quickly and
efficiently").
.110. See ELC, supra note 24, Europ. T.S. No. 141, 30 I.L.M. 148 (requiring signato-
ries to criminalize money laundering activities); EC Money Laundering Directive, supra
note 24, O.J. L 166/77 (1991) (requiring Member States to criminalize laundering of
drug trafficking proceeds).
111. ELC, supra note 24, art. 6, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 116-17, 30'I.L.M. at 152; see
EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 24, art. 1, O.J. L 166/77, at 79 (1991)
(requiring Member States to implement provisions of Vienna U.N. Drug Convention
and ELC).
112. ELC, supra note 24, Europ. T.S. No. 141, 30 I.L.M. 148.
113. Id. art. 6, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 115-16, 30 I.L.M. at 152.
114. See id. arts. 7-35, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 117-31, 30 I.L.M. at 153-61 (establish-
ing measures for international cooperation in prevention of money laundering).
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Meanwhile, the EC Money Laundering Directive115 obligates
Member States to prohibit the laundering of drug-related pro-
ceeds 1 6 and to amend their criminal legislation to fulfill their
obligations under the Vienna U.N. Drug Convention and the
ELC.1
17
1. The Council of Europe's European Laundering Convention
.The ELC seeks to counter international crime through two
avenues." 8 Domestically, the ELC requires Member States to en-
act legislation that will prevent money laundering.1 19 Interna-
tionally, the ELC requires its signatories to cooperate with one
another in the prevention and prosecution of money launder-
ing.120
a. Domestic Money Laundering Provisions
The ELC 121 requires its signatories to construct a system of
international cooperation that will deprive criminals of the pro-
ceeds of their crimes.122 The drafters of the ELC built upon the
Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, using, whenever possible, largely
115. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 24, O.J. L 166/77 (1991).
116. Id. arts. 1-2, O.J. L 166/77, at 79 (1991).
117. Id. Statement by the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States Meeting Within the Council, Oj. L 166/77, at 83 (1991).
118. See ELC, supra note 24, arts. 2-6, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 115-17, 30 I.L.M. at
151-52 (enumerating signatories' domestic money laundering obligations); id. arts. 7-
35, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 117-31, 30 I.L.M. at 152-61 (enumerating international coop-
eration obligations).
119. Id. arts. 2-6, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 115-17,30 I.L.M. at 151-52.
120. Id. arts. 7-35, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 117-31, 30 I.L.M.-at 152-61.
121. ELC, supra note 24, Europ. T.S. No. 141, 30 I.L.M. 148. As of May, 1992, the
ELC had fifteen signatories: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom. Zagaris & Castilla, supra note 74, at 895. The ELC became effective
upon ratification by three signatories. ELC, supra note 24, art. 36(3), Europ. T.S. No.
141, at 132, 30 I.L.M. at 162.
122. ELC, supra note 24, arts. 2-6, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 115-17, 30 I.L.M. at 151-
52. The ELC obligates each signatory to take all domestic measures to:
[A]dopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish
under its domestic law, when committed intentionally. a. the conversion or
transfer of property, knowing that such property is proceeds, for the purpose
of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any
person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade
the legal consequences of his actions.
Id. art. 6(1), Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 116, 30 I.L.M. at 152.
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the same terminology.123  The ELC, however, expanded on the
Vienna U.N. Drug Convention by criminalizing non-drug-related
money laundering. 12
4
The ELC relies on Member States' criminal statutes to serve
as the foundation for overcoming the obstacle of bank se-
crecy. 12 5 Like the Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, the ELC au-
thorizes EU financial institutions to reveal banking information
to requesting authorities in money laundering cases. 126 Further,
businesses12 7 must require customers to identify themselves and
are required to establish self-monitoring mechanisms and indus-
try standards to achieve this customer identification. 12 8  The
ELC's criminalization of negligent money laundering imposes
an additional duty on financial institutions. 91 2
b. International Cooperation in the Prevention of Money
I Laundering
Chapter Three of the .ELC requires its signatories to assist
one another in identifying and tracing the property used in the
commission of any offenses and any assets or proceeds derived
therefrom. 30 The ELC signatories are also required to cooper-
ate with one another, to the greatest extent possible, in investi-
gating' 3 1 and confiscating'32 proceeds and property derived
123. Zagaris & Kingma, supra note 54, at 450 n.20. The Vienna U.N. Drug Con-
vention is narrower than subsequent international regimes, in part, because its signato-
ries represent a diverse group of nations. Id. at 448. Commentators view the ELC as a
more ambitious document, with the potential "to revolutionize international coopera-
tion and the overall development of the regime regulating international money move-
ment." Id. at 466.
124. Compare Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, art. 3(1)(b)(i), 1992
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 5, 28 I.L.M. at 501 (prohibiting conversion or disguise of prop-
erty associated with illicit narcotics) with ELC, supra note 24, art. 6(1) (a), Europ. T.S.
No. 141, at 116, 30 I.L.M. at 152 (prohibiting conversion or transfer of any property for
purpose of concealment or disguise).
125. ELC, supra note 24, arts. 3, 4(1), Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 115, 30 I.L.M. at 151.
126. Id. art. 4(1), Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 115, 30 I.L.M. at 157.
127. See Clemens Kochinke, E.C. Launches Offensive Against Money Laundering, 6
INT'L ENFORCEMENT. L. REP. 50, 51 (1990) (noting that ELC reporting requirements
apply to banks, all other financial institutions, casinos, and currency exchanges).
128. Id. at 52.
129. Zagaris & Kingma, supra note 54, at 467.
130. ELC, supra note 24, arts. 8-10, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 118, 30 I.L.M. at 153.
131. See id art. 7(1), Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 117, 30 I.L.M. at 153 (stating that
signatories "shall co-operate with each other to the widest extent possible for the pur-
poses of investigations and proceedings aiming at the confiscation of instrumentalities
and proceeds").
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from criminal activity. 3 The ELC obligates its signatories to un-
dertake cooperative measures," 4 including investigative proce-
dures, 3 -5 specific investigative powers and techniques, 3 6 and
legal remedies to protect the rights of the accused. 3 7 Signato-
ries are also required to consider implementing additional inves-
tigative techniques to combat money laundering.' s
Whereas the Vienna U.N. Drug Convention requires that a
signatory request information before it is forwarded,13 9 the ELC
permits one signatory to forward information to another without
prior request, if the information is thought to provide assistance
in carrying out an investigation. 4 ° The ELC also outlines a sig-
natory's ability to seize criminally obtained assets outside its bor-
ders.' In addition, the ELC permits a signatory to seize a sus-
132. Id. art. 13, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 119-20, 30 I.L.M. at 154.
133. Id. arts. 7-8, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 117-18, 30 I.L.M. at 153.
134. See id. arts. 8-10, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 118, 30 I.L.M. at 153 (discussing
investigative assistance among signatories). The ELC applies "to diverse decisions, by
criminal courts, administrative courts, and separate judicial authorities, to confiscate in
civil or criminal proceedings totally separate from those in which the guilt of the of-
fender is determined." Zagaris & Kingma, supra note 53, at 456 n.13.
135. ELC, supra note 24, art. 7(1), Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 117, 30 I.L.M. at 153.
136. See id. arts. 23-35, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 125-31, 30 I.L.M. at 158-61 (articu-
lating mechanics of international cooperation).
137. Id. art. 21(3), Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 125, 30 I.L.M. at 157.
138. Id. art. 4, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 115-16, 30 I.L.M. at 151. The ELC suggests
new investigative techniques, including:
(a) monitoring orders or judicial orders to a financial institution to give infor-
mation about transactions conducted through an account held by a particular
person with the institution (such an order is usually valid for a specific pe-
riod);
(b) observation, which is an investigative technique of law enforcement agen-
cies that consist in covertly watching the movements of persons without hear-
ing them;
(c) interception of telecommunications, which includes interception of telephone
conversations, telex and telefax communications;
(d) access to computer systems; and
(e) production orders instruct[ing] individuals to produce specific records, doc-
uments or other items or property in their possession. Failure to comply with
such an order may result in an order for search and seizure. The order might
require that records or documents are produced in a specific form, as when
the order concerns computer-generated material.
Zagaris & Kingma, supra note 54, at 491 n.168 (summarizing Article 4 of ELC).
139. See Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, art. 7(2), 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 26, at 11, 28 I.L.M. at 508. Article 7(2) states that mutual legal assistance "may be
requested." Id. Article 7(2) is silent, however, on a signatory's authority to render un-
requested assistance. Id.
140. ELC, supra note 24, art. 10, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 118, 30 I.L.M. at 153.
141. Id. art. 11, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 119, 30 I.L.M. at 153-54.
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pect's assets within its borders, prior to conviction, at the request
of another signatory. 4 '
2. The EC Money Laundering Directive
As a complement to the ELC, the EC Money Laundering
Directive 143 ("Money Laundering Directive") imposes an obliga-
tion on Member States to criminalize the laundering of drug-
related proceeds. 1  The Money Laundering Directive adopted
the Vienna U.N. Drug Convention's definition of money laun-
dering.145 The Directive was not designed to be an instrument
to harmonize criminal legislation.' 46 Nonetleless, its drafters
sought to achieve international cooperation by requiring Mem-
ber States to comply with the money laundering provisions of
the Vienna U.N. Drug Convention and the ELC.'47 The Money
Laundering Directive also invites Member States to extend its
scope to other serious crimes.
14
Under the Money Laundering Directive's provisions, Mem-
ber States are required to impose obligations on their domestic
financial institutions to record and alert the authorities to any
142. Id. art. 13, Europ. T.S. No. 141, at 119-20, 30 I.L.M. at 154.
143. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 24, O.J. L 166/77 (1991).
144. See id. art. 2, O.J. L 166/77, at 79 (1991) (stating that "Member States shall
ensure that money laundering as defined in this Directive is prohibited."). Money laun-
dering is defined as:
[T]he [intentional] conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such
property is derived from criminal activity ... for the purpose of concealing or
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is
involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal consequences of
his action ....
Id. art 1, O.J. L 166/77, at 79 (1991).
145. Id. art. 1, Oj. L 166/77, at 79 (1991). Article 1 states that" '[c]riminal activ-
ity' means a crime specified in Article 3(1) (a) of the Vienna [U.N. Drug] Convention."
Id.; see Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, art. 3(1)(a), 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 26, at 5, 28 I.L.M. at 500-01 (listing drug-related activities proscribed by Vienna
U.N. Drug Convention).
146. Flynn, supra note 10, at 1.
147. EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 24, Statement by the Representa-
tives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting Within the Council, O.J. L
166/77, at 83 (1991). This Statement obligates Member States "to take all necessary
steps by 31 December 1992 at the latest to enact criminal legislation enabling them to
comply with their obligations under the [Vienna U.N. Drug Convention and the ELC]."
Id.
148. Id. art. 1, O.j. L 166/77, at 79 (1991). Article 1 states that its provisions may
cover "any... criminal activity designated as such for the purposes of this Directive by
each Member State." Id.
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suspicious transactions.'49 Specifically, the Money Laundering
Directive precludes financial institutions from carrying out trans-
actions that these institutions suspect may be related to money
laundering, until they have alerted the appropriate national au-
thorities, who may then instruct them not to execute the transac-
tion.15 Such disclosure to the authorities does not subject finan-
cial institutions or their agents to liability under bank secrecy
laws. 151
E. Regional Police Cooperation Initiatives
The primary impetus for creating cross-border police coop-
eration mechanisms within the European Union was Article 13
of the SEA, 5' which called for the abolition of internal border
controls to achieve the creation of the Internal Market. 5 Mem-
ber States recognized that the removal of border and passport
controls posed a threat to the internal security of the European
Union.' 54 Member States embarked on several initiatives'55 to
allow law enforcement to respond effectively1 56 to the threat of
increased international crime.157
149. See id. arts. 2-11, O.J. L 166/77, at 79-81 (1991) (discussing financial institu-
tions' obligation to notify authorities of suspected wrongdoing).
150. Id. art. 7, OJ. L 166/77, at 80 (1991). Article 7 states that a financial institu-
tion may complete a suspected money laundering transaction without alerting the au-
thorities if "to refrain in such manner is impossible or is likely to frustrate efforts to
pursue the beneficiaries of a suspected money-laundering operation." Id. Under these
circumstances, "the institutions concerned shall apprise the authorities immediately af-
terwards." Id.
151. Id. art. 9, OJ. L 166/77, at 81 (1991).
152. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (quoting SEA Article 8(a)).
153. See SEA, supra note 1, art. 13, OJ. L 169/1, at 7 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at
747. Article 13 states that "[tihe internal market shall comprise an area without inter-
nal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is en-
sured in accordance with the provisions of [the Treaty of Rome]." Id.
154. den Boer, supra note 18, at 4; see Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 552-54
(discussing effect of abolition of internal border controls on crime).
155. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing regional police coop-
eration initiatives).
156. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 552-54.
157, See den Boer, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that abolition of internal border
controls provides crucial impetus for increased international police cooperation). But
see den Boer, supra note 18, at 4 (noting that assumption that abolition of border con-
trols will cause rise in international crime is open to question).
[This] philosophy is weak, because it is based on the dubious assumption that
in a region with border controls, internationally active criminals move around
with caution, while in a region without border controls, international
criminals become complacent about their movements. One may question
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1. The Pompidou Group
In 1980, the Council of Europe established the Pompidou
Group.158 In 1984, the Pompidou Group began to examine co-
operation among Member States' criminal justice systems and
social and health services by cataloging and analyzing the differ-
ences between its members in the prosecution and treatment of
illicit drug use and trafficking.159 These studies led to several
efforts designed to coordinate international measures to combat
drug trafficking and use.16 ° To effectively counter the increasing
sophistication of international crime, the Pompidou Group con-
cluded that international cooperation was essential. 61
2. The Trevi Group
The Trevi Group 62 was established in 1975 and originally
whether the abolition of border controls affects the mobile and behavioural
pattern of criminals. The assumption ignores that in the past, international
crime had the chance to expand across the borders of nation-states despite the
existence of border controls, and it backshadows the fact that criminals have
even been able to capitalise on the existence of border controls.
Id. at 3-4.
158. Carlson & Zagaris, supra note 4, at 565 (citing Council of Europe, A Brief
Description of the Activities of the Pompidou Group and Its Establishment within the Framework of
the Council of Europe 1, Oct. 4, 1989, P-PG(88) Inf. 1). The authors indicate that:
The Original members of the Group were Belgium, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom. Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden were subsequently admitted to the
Group. Turkeyjoined the Group when the Partial Agreement was established
by the Council of Europe in March 1980. Since then Greece became a mem-
ber in 1981, Norway in 1983, Spain in 1984, Portugal and Switzerland in 1985,
Finland in 1987, Austria on 1 January 1988, Malta on 1 April 1988 and Cyprus
on 1 October 1989 bringing the number of member states to 20.
Certain countries which are not members of the Council of Europe par-
ticipate in some activities of the Group on a technical ad hoc basis, for exam-
ple, Canada, the United States, and the Holy See.
In addition since May 1986, the Commission of the European Communi-
ties takes part in the Group's work with a view to ensuring coordination of the
two organization's activities.
Id. at 565 n.63 (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 565.
160. Id. at 565-66.
161. Id. at 566-67 (citing Council of Europe, Background Paper on Confiscation of the
Proceeds of Drug Trafficking at the Extraordinary Ministerial Conference in London, May 18-19,
1989 2 (1989) P-PG/MIN (89) 3).
162. See Benyon, supra note 108, at 60 (discussing activities of Trevi Group and
noting that nature of organization hampers efforts to discuss its activities fully).
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focused on political crime and terrorism 163 and later expanded
to address drug trafficking and organized crime.1" The Trevi
Group is divided into three tiers, with the Trevi Ministers consti-
tuting the top tier.16 The Trevi Ministers are the ministers of
the EU Member States responsible for police and public secur-
ity."' The middle tier consists of senior civil servants and police
officers who analyze the reports written by working groups in
preparation for the Trevi Ministers' meetings.'6 7 The third tier,
comprised of police officers, civil servants, and other experts in
relevant fields, creates working group reports.
168
The Trevi Group operates outside the framework of EU in-
stitutional structures.'69 The Trevi Group lacks procedures for
reporting its activities to the Commission 70 or the European
Parliament.1 7 ' Similarly, while the Trevi Ministers are accounta-
ble only to their own governments, there is no requirement to
report decisions and discussions occurring within the Working
Groups to their national parliaments.
72
Since the Trevi Group's 'formation, there have been four
163. Anderson, supra note 103, at 9.'
164. Kenneth G. Robertson, Practical Police Cooperation in Europe: The Intelligence
Dimension, in POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 106, 113 (Malcolm Anderson &
Monica den Boer eds., 1994). Every Member State participate in the Trevi Group. Id.
In addition, other "friends of Trevi" are affiliated with its work and attend its meetings.
The "friends of Trevi" include: Norway, Switzerland, Morocco, Canada, and the United
States. Benyon, supra note 108, at 60. The Trevi Group provides a forum in which
Member States may discuss police and national security matters of common concern.
Schutte, supra note 27, at 80. The first meeting of the Group took place in Rome, close
to the famous Trevi Fountain. Id. at 80 n.83.,
165. Benyon, supra note 108, at 59.
166. Leslie S. Potter & Bruce Zagaris, Toward a Common U.S. Mexican Cultural Heri-
tage: The need for a Regional Americas Initiative in the Recovery and Return of Stolen Cultural
Property, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAw 627, n.321 (1992); see E. Muller-Rappard, THE 'EUROPEAN
RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERROR-
ISM: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 385, 410-11 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988) (providing addi-
tional background on activities of Trevi Ministers).
167. Benyon, supra note 108, at 59.
168. Id.
169. Anderson, supra note 103, at 12.
170. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text (discussing role of Commission
in European Union).
171. Benyon, supra note 108, at 61; see supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text
(discussing structure of European Union).
172. Benyon, supra note 108, at 61. Benyon notes that a low level of accountability,
combined with the secrecy of the outcome of Trevi's meetings, raises serious questions
about the Group's political legitimacy. Id.
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Working Groups. 7 Working Group I, however, is the only
group that has a directly operational role, providing secure com-
munications links among Member States for the transmission of
sensitive international terrorism information. 174 Working.Group
III focused on serious forms of international crime, including
drug trafficking, organized crime, and money laundering. 75
These Working Groups' recommendations produce tangible re-
sults.' 76 For example, Working Group III's recommendations
were responsible for the creation of the network of Drug Liaison
Officers both without and within the European Union. 77 The
Trevi Group has also developed standardized and cooperative
policing techniques tailored for specific types of crimes.17 Trevi
also contributes simply by bringing together representatives
from different police forces. 1 79
3. The Trevi Action Programme
In 1990, Member States' recognition that European integra-
tion would require improved international police cooperation 8 °
created the impetus for the Trevi Action Programme ("Action
Programme")."' The objectives of the Action Programme are
embodied in a document that incorporates all of the police co-
operation measures on which Member States agreed, whether or
173. Id. at 59-60. In 1977, the Trevi Group established Working Group I to coordi-
nate activity against terrorism and related issues. Id. The Trevi Group simultaneously
established Working Group II to exchange information on training, equipment, public
order, and private security issues. Id. In June, 1985, Working Group II expanded to
include analysis on soccer hooliganism. Id. Working Group IV, existing between 1988
and 1992, focused on the policing and internal security consequences of the abolition
of border controls. Id.; see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing SEA Arti-
cle 13's abolition of border controls).
174. Anderson, supra note 103, at 12.
175. Benyon, supra note 108, at 60. Working Group III focuses on computer
crime, environmental crime, automobile crime, and trafficking in stolen antiques and
works of art. Id.
176. Id. at 59-60. But see Robertson, supra note 164, at 113 (discussing shortcom-
ings of Trevi Group structure).
177. Benyon, supra note 108, at 60.
178. Id. Specific crimes requiring specialized policing techniques include environ-
mental crime and soccer hooliganism. Id.
179. Id. Although it is not provided for formally, the development of personal
relationships enhances cooperation. Id.
180. Anderson, supra note 103, at 3.
181. See id. at 12-13 (discussing Trevi Action Programme).
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not such measures were feasible at the time. 82 The document
provides for extensive anti-drug trafficking cooperation meas-
ures, including the use of controlled delivery, 8 ' the use of both
bi-national and multi-national operational teams, and training
and research programs.18 4
The Action Programme achieves intergovernmental com-
munication and coordination through establishing an informa-
tion exchange center for data held by national drug intelligence
units.'8 5 The Action Programme envisioned that liaison officers
would effectuate cooperation between Member States.'8 6 Fur-
thermore, while the Action Programme encourages cooperation
between liaison officers, the liaison officers are only accountable
to their national authorities. 87
4. The Schengen Convention
On June 14, 1985, five Member States concluded the
Schengen Agreement,'88 which represented the first attempt to
create an area within the European Union without internal bor-
ders.'8 9 The Agreement was later expanded by the Schengen
Convention. 9 ° The Schengen Convention focuses on five inter-
related areas: the abolition of checks at internal borders and the
182. Id. at 12. The Action Programme's preamble states that the Trevi system does
not prejudice previously established agreements and systems, such as Interpol. Id.
183. Id. See Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, art. 1(g), 1992 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 26, at 4, 28 IL.M. at 499. The Vienna U.N. Drug Convention defines "con-
trolled delivery" as:
the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments of narcotic [or other
illegal] drugs.., or substances substituted for them, to pass out of, through or
into the territory of one or more countries, with the knowledge and under the
supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to identifying persons
involved in the commission of [the relevant illegal acts].
Id.
184. Anderson, supra note 103, at 12.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 12-13. Liaison Officer cooperation includes access to the national crim-
inal intelligence databases of other Member States. Id.
188. Schengen Convention, supra note 31, 30 I.L.M. 84.
189. Martin Baldwin-Edwards & Bill Hebenton, Will SIS Be Europe's Big Brother?, in
POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 137, 138-39 (Malcolm Anderson & Monica den
Boer eds., 1994) [hereinafter Baldwin-Edwards].
190. Schengen Convention, supra note 31, 30 I.L.M. 84. Italyjoined the Schengen
Convention on November 27, 1990. Benyon, supra note 108, at 57. Portugal and Spain
joined in June, 1991, and Greece joined in November 1992. Id.
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free movement of persons;191 police and security measures to re-
spond to this innovation; 192 the Schengen Information System
(SIS);193 the free movement of goods; 194 and the protection of
personal data. 95
The Schengen Convention's signatories originally sought to
eliminate controls at their common borders to attain economic
advantages.' 9 6 In Member States' efforts to counter interna-
tional crime, however, the Schengen Convention is significant
because it represents the first attempt among any Member States
to integrate the three spheres of EU police cooperation. 97 It
provides for legislative harmonization,'98 a centralized data ex-
change system, 199 and operational police cooperation. °0
a. Legislative Harmonization and Operational Police
Cooperation
The Schengen Convention establishes new and permanent
institutions dedicated to overseeing its implementation, particu-
larly in the area of drug trafficking. 20' The Schengen Conven-
tion requires signatories to develop common policies on the
granting of visas2 2 and asylum.20 1 It also contains specific provi-
191. Schengen Convention, supra note 31, arts. 2-38, 30 I.L.M. at 86-95. Title II is
entitled "Abolition of checks at internal borders and movement of persons." Id.
192. Id. arts. 39-91, 30 I.L.M. at 101-23.
193. Id. arts. 92-119, 30 I.L.M. at 123-34. Title IV of the Convention is entitled
"The Schengen Information System" ("SIS"). Id.
194. Id. arts. 120-25, 30 I.L.M. at 135-37. Title V of the Convention is entitled
"Transport and movement of goods." Id.
195. Id. arts. 126-30, 30 I.L.M. at 137-40. Title VI of the Convention is entitled
"Protection of personal data." Id.
196. Baldwin-Edwards, supra note 189, at 138. The "[m] ovement of goods was to
profit from the elimination of control procedures at the respective borders, and mutual
trade was expected to receive a substantial boost" Id.
197. Benyon, supra note 108, at 57-59.
198. Schengen Convention, supra note 31, arts. 9-17, 30 IL.M. at 89-92 (providing
for harmonization of EU Member States' visa policies).
199. See id. arts. 92-119, 30 I.L.M. at 123-35 (establishing SIS).
200. See id. arts. 39-47, 30 I.L.M. at 101-10 (specifying parameters for police coop-
eration).
201. See Bruce Zagaris, Schengen Convention Points Way to Enhanced EC Criminal Coop-
eration, 7 Iwr'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 26 (1991) (discussing international police cooper-
ation aspects of Schengen Convention); Five EC Members Reach Agreement on Sdhengen
Accord, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 226 (1990) (noting potential impact of Schengen
Convention on combatting international drug trafficking).
202. Schengen Convention, supra note 31, art. 9, 30 I.L.M. at 89. Article 9(1)
states: "The Contracting Parties undertake to adopt a common policy on the move-
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sions on police force cooperation,20 4 drug trafficking, 20 5 and ille-
gal firearms and explosives activity.206 Article 39207 requires po-
lice to render mutual assistance, upon request, for the purpose
of preventing and detecting criminal offenses.2 0 8 The Schengen
Convention also calls for the establishment of a permanent
working group to examine common problems of drug criminal-
ity.209 Article 40210 grants signatories the jurisdiction to continue
investigations beyond the physical confines of their borders. 1 '
Signatories' police officials are empowered to render, assistance
to one another for the prevention or investigation of crime. 12
Each country's national law, however, remains paramount.2 13
ment of persons and in particular on the arrangements for visas. They shall give each
other assistance to that end. The Contracting Parties undertake to pursue by common
agreement the harmonization of their policies on visas." Id. See id. arts. 10-18, 30 I.L.M.
at 89-92 (detailing particulars of visa arrangements under Convention).
203. Id. Final Act (5), 30 I.L.M. at 145. "Contracting Parties shall make an inven-
tory of national asylum policies with a view to the harmonization thereof." Id. The
Schengen Convention defines application for asylum as:'
[A] ny application submitted in writing, orally or otherwise by a [person other
than a national of an EU Member State] at an external border or within the
territory of a Contracting Party with a view to obtaining recognition as a refu-
gee in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the
Status of Refugees ....
Id. art. 1, 30 I.L.M. at 86.
204. Id. arts. 39-47, 30 I.L.M. at 101-12.
205. Id. arts. 70-76, 30 I.L.M. at 116-18.
206. Id. arts. 77-91, 30 I.L.M. at 118-23.
207. Id. art. 39(1), 30 I.L.M. at 101. Article 39(1) obligates signatories to "under-
take to ensure that their police authorities shall, in compliance with national legislation
... assist each other for the purposes of preventing and detecting criminal offenses."
Id. Although assist is not explicitly defined in the Schengen Convention, it is under-
stood to include the sharing ofinformation. Baldwin-Edwards, supra note 189, at 140.
208. Schengen Convention, supra note 31, art. 39, 30 I.L.M. at 101.
209. Id. art. 70, 30 I.L.M. at 116.
210. Id. art. 40(1), 30 I.L.M. at 101-02.
211. Id. To illustrate, assume that a hypothetical suspect whom the law enforce-
ment authorities of Nation A have been investigating has crossed into Nation B. Article
40(1) authorizes Nation A to continue monitoring the suspect in Nation B, even when
Nation A does not yet have evidence sufficient to support. an extradition request. Id.
The officers of Nation A, however, would be subject to certain limitations regarding the
conduct of their investigation: they are not allowed to enter private dwellings, and may
interrogate or arrest the suspect only if in hot pursuit. Id. art. 39(3), 30 I.L.M. at 101.
Further, the Nation A officers can continue their surveillance only if they believe the
suspect has committed murder, rape, arson, fraud, firearm or drug trafficking, or toxic
waste trafficking. Id.
212. Id. art. 39, 30 I.L.M. at 101.
213. Id. art. 39(1), 30 I.L.M. at 101. Each signatory's evidentiary and procedural
rules of law ultimately control the criminal proceeding. Id.
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For example, when a signatory requests and is supplied with writ-
ten information, the requesting signatory cannot use the evi-
dence to inculpate a suspect without the approval of that signa-
tory's competent judicial authority.214
b. The Schengen Information System
The Schengen Convention provides for the establishment
of a common information system, the Schengen Information
System ("SIS").215 SIS enables Convention signatories to access
data on people and objects for'the purpose of border checks and
police inquiries.216 SIS is not a system that links existing police
information databases or computer systems; it is an independent
transnational system.217 The purpose of SIS is to preserve the
order and public security of its signatories, who anticipate that
they will be especially threatened by the free circulation of per-
sons within their signatories' territory.218
Articles 95 through 100219 identify the six categories of in-
formation which are to be collected and maintained within the
SIS.22° Access to SIS is governed by elaborate procedural safe-
214. Id.
215. Id. art. 92, 30 I.L.M. at 123.
216. Id. art. 92(2), 30 I.L.M. at 123.
217. Baldwin-Edwards, supra note 189, at 140. SIS is composed of identical na-
tional databases joined by a central information system. Id. SIS will eventually be in-
stalled at the external border control sites. Id.
218. Schengen Convention, supra note 31, art. 92(1), 30 I.L.M. at 123-24. "The
Schengen Information System shall enable the authorities.. . , by means of an auto-
mated search procedure, to have access to reports on persons and objects for the pur-
poses of border checks and controls and other police ... checks carried out within the
country in accordance with national law .... " Id.
219. Id. arts. 95-100, 30 I.L.M. at 125-28.
220. Id. The relevant language is:
Article 95(1): Data relating to persons wanted for arrest for extradition
purposes. [Such an entry must include minimum essential background infor-
mation on the entry].
Article 96: Data relating to aliens who are reported for the purpose of
being refused entry [into the territory of the Parties to the Convention].
Article 97: Data relating to persons who have disappeared or to persons
who, in the interests of their own protection or in order to prevent threats,
need to be placed provisionally in a place of safety at the request of. . .the
reporting Party.
Article 98: [Data relating to witnesses or suspects summoned to appear
before a court in criminal proceedings].
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guards and the database is reserved exclusively for border con-
trol, police, customs, and immigration officials.2 21  The
Schengen Convention also states that a signatory's agents may
use the information only for the six stated purposes.222 Further,
when a signatory enters an individual's name onto the SIS under
one of these categories, only certain types of information may be
entered.225
Despite these precautions, however, SIS raises serious per-
sonal privacy concerns. Specific provisions govern the protec-
tion of personal data 2 5 and the security of data on SIS.226 Arti-
cle 117227 requires signatories to take measures to ensure that
personal or private data remain protected, at least to the degree
prescribed in the relevant Council of Europe resolutions.2 28 Fur-
ther, each signatory must take measures to prevent any unau-
Article 99: Data relating to persons or vehicles.., for the purposes of
discreet surveillance or specific checks.
Article 100: Data relating to objects sought for the purpose of seizure
Id.
221. Baldwin-Edwards, supra note 189, at 141-42.
222. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text (describing six instances where
individual's name and information may be reported). One commentator notes that if
the information can be used in conjunction with any or all of the six categories, as
opposed to the specific category under which it was originally reported, the Conven-
tion's personal data protection safeguards are severely undermined. Baldwin-Edwards,
supra note 189, at 143. He continues: "States can [circumvent] the 'purpose limitation'
principle where it can be justified by theneed to prevent an imminent serious threat to
public order and safety, for serious reasons of state security or for the purposes of
preventing a serious offense (Article 102)." Id. (citations omitted).
223. Schengen Convention, supra note 31, arts. 126-30, 30 I.L.M. at 137-40. Title
VI of the Schengen Convention is entitled "Protection of Personal Data." Id.
224. Charles D. Raab, Police Cooperation: The Prospects for Privacy, in POLICING
ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 121, 128-30 (Malcolm Anderson & Monica den Boer,
eds. 1994); see generally Baldwin-Edwards, supra note 189 (discussing privacy issues).
225. Schengen Convention, supra note 31, arts. 126-30, 30 I.L.M. at 137-40.
226. Id. arts. 102-18, 30 I.L.M. at 129-34.
227. Id. art. 117, 30 I.L.M. at 133.
228. Id. The Schengen Convention refers to the Council of Europe's standard for
data protection:
[T] he Council of Europe Convention of 28January 1981 for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data, and in
compliance with Recommendation R (87) 15 of 17 September 1987 of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe regulating the use of per-
sonal data in the police sector.
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thorized access to such information, including preventing unau-
thorized copying, transmittal, modification or removal of
data.2 9
F. Europol Drugs Unit and the Europol Convention
Pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty,23° EU institutions now
have greater authority in areas of internal security and police
cooperation. 3' Maastricht created the Council of Ministers of
Justice and Home Affairs, and empowered them to create an EU-
wide police agency.23 2 Subsequently, the Council of Ministers of
Justice and Home Affairs created the EDU 233 and recently com-
pleted the Europol Convention.234 While the EDU is currently
operating, Europol will not come into full effect until the Euro-
pol Convention is ratified by the Member States. 3 5
1. The Maastricht Treaty: Catalyst for the Creation of Europol
Maastricht 236 amends and supplements the 1957 Treaty of
Rome, 3 7 and the 1987 SEA,23 8 which prepared for the creation
of the European Union's internal market after 1992.239 Towards
the goal of harmonizing policies associated with criminal justice,
Maastricht commits Member States to regard what were tradi-
tionally national interests as areas of common interest, includ-
ing: policies on asylum; 24° border checks;241 immigration;24 2
229. Id. art. 118, 30 I.L.M. at 133-34.
230. TEU, supra note 1, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 719.
231. Id. art. K11(9), O.J. C 224/1, at97 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 735; see supra
note 6 and accompanying text (quoting Article K1 (9)).
232. TEU, supra note 1, art. K11(9), O.J. C 224/1, at 97 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 735. "Member States shall regard ... as [a] matter[ ] of common interest... the
organization of a Union-wide system for exchanging information within a European
Police Office (Europol)." Id.
233. See Council's Joint Action, supra note 16, O.J. L 62/1 (1995) (discussing
Council's creation of EDU).
234. Europol Convention, supra note 5, 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex.
235. Id. art. 45, 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex, at 67-68; see EU: Criticism of Cannes
Focuses on Europol, supra note 15 (noting that Europol Convention will not enter into
force until it is ratified by Member States).
236. TEU, supra note 1, O.J. C 224/1 (1992).
237. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1.
238. SEA, supra note 1, art. 8(a), O.J. L 169/1, at 7 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at
747.
239. See supra note 2 (quoting SEA art. 13).
240. See supra note 199 (discussing Schengen Convention's definition of asylum).
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drug addiction;2 43 international fraud;2 1 judicial cooperation; 45
customs cooperation;24 6 and police cooperation.2 47
Maastricht's objectives in the area of justice and home af-
fairs will be achieved by operational support and other forms of
international cooperation.248 As to operational support, Article
KI1 (9) calls for the development of a system of information ex-
change to prevent and combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and
other serious forms of international crime.249 The drafters of
Maastricht also envisioned that Europol would provide an EU-
wide system for exchanging information on criminal activity
among EU Member States.25 °
Maastricht grants EU institutions a limited role in the area
of international police cooperation.2 5 1 The European Coun-
241. TEU, supra note 1, art. I1, OJ. C 224/1, at 97 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
735.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing police cooperation under
TEU Article K.I(1)-(9)). Article K3 permits for the adoption of joint positions and
international conventions relating to justice and home affairs. Id. art. K3(a)-(c). One
commentator notes that "[tihis will facilitate for more systematic regulation in an area
withunratified agreements on asylum and external frontiers policy." Neil Walker, Euro-
pean Integration and European Policing: A Complex Relationship, in POLICING ACROSS NA-
TIONAL BOUNDARIES 22, 29 (Malcolm Anderson & Monica den Boer eds., 1994).
248. Walker, supra note 247, at 28.
249. TEU, supra note 1, art. YIl(9), O.J. C 224/1, at 97 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 735. This cooperation may include customs officials. Id.
250. Id.
251. Jean-Louis Debrouwer, The Treaty on European Union: New Perspectives for the
Fight Against Crime, 7 INrr'L L. PRACTnCUM 84, 84 (1994). See supra notes 33-48 and ac-
companying text (discussing functions of EU institutions).
The Commission is associated with the Maastricht provisions, and shares the right
of initiative with the Member States regarding all areas of Article K except customs
cooperation, criminal justice cooperation, and police cooperation. TEU, supra note 1,
art. K.3(2), O.J. C 224/1, at 97-98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 736. The Presidency of
the Commission is to inform regularly the European Parliament of all justice and home
affairs activity. Id. art. K6, O.J. C 224/1, at 98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 737. Since
the Commission is not directly involved in customs, criminal justice, and police cooper-
ation, however, the Council must inform Parliament of measures in these areas, so that
Parliament may consider whether such measures are consistent with the overarching
principals of the European Union. Telephone interview with Jean-Louis Debrouwer,
Administrator with the Secretariat General of the Commission of the European Union
(Mar. 1, 1995). The Parliament has the right to make recommendations to or ask ques-
tions of the Council. TEU, supra note 1, art. K6, O.J. C 224/1, at 98 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 737. The Council may confer jurisdiction to the European Court ofJustice
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cil,25 2 the bi-annual meeting of Member States' leaders, makes
decisions concerning justice and home affairs. 5 Pursuant to its
powers under Maastricht, the European Council finalized the
current version of the Europol Convention, which may be rati-
fied by the Member States. 2 4
2. The EDU's Organizational Structure and Scope
of Authority
The TEU's Declaration on Police Cooperation 255 delineates
Europol's anticipated functions.2 56 These functions fall into
three categories.2 57 First, Europol is to provide support for na-
tional criminal investigation and security authorities, particularly
through coordinating investigations and search operations. 58
Second, Europol is to create a computer database that enables it
to provide central analysis and assessment of data to develop in-
vestigative strategies.259 Finally, Europol will compile and ana-
lyze Member States' drug prevention programs to promote pre-
vention strategies, training, and research. 6 °
Until the Member States ratify the Europol Convention, the
EDU will continue to operate under the Council's Joint Action
document of March 10, 1995 ("Council's Joint Action docu-
ment") .261 This agreement replaced the Ministerial Agreement
of June 2, 1993.62 The EDU began operations in January
to interpret provisions of treaties drawn up by the Council. Id. art. K3(2)(c), O.J. C
224/1, at 98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 736.
252. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text (discussing role of Council and
other EU institutions).
253. TEU, supra note 1, art. K3(2), O.J. C 224/1, at 98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 736.
254. Id. art. K.3(2) (c), OJ. C 224/1, at 98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 736.
255. Id. O.J. C 224/1, at 1; Declaration on Police Cooperation, O.J. C 191/108
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 792.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Council'sJoint Action, supra note 16, art. 1, OJ. L 62/1, at 1 (1995). Austria,
Finland and Sweden, who acceded to the European Union on January 1, 1995, have
joined the EDU through a Common Joint Action Agreement completed at the Meeting
of the Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Essen. Interview with Jean-
Louis Debrouwer, supra note 251.
262. Council's Joint Action, supra note 16, art. 1, O.J. L 62/1, at 1 (1995).
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1993.263 Its permanent headquarters is in the Hague, the
Netherlands.2 6
A committee comprised of the Council of Ministers of Jus-
tice and Home Affairs2 65 of the EU Member States supervises the
EDU. 2" The EDU's current Coordinator, Jurgen Storbeck, was
appointed by these Ministers. 267 The Coordinator,268 along with
two assistant Coordinators, are responsible for the day-to-day op-
erations of the EDU.2 69 The EDU is run principally through the
coordination of the Europol Liaison Officers, 7 ° comprised of
police and customs service agents from the Member States. 71
Member States finance the EDU, according to their respective
gross national products.272 The cost of the Liaison Officers's
equipment is borne by their respective nations.7 3
The EDU is non-operational, meaning that it is prohibited
from taking part in any physical actions.2 74 The Council's Joint
Action document restricts the EDU's activities to exchanging
263. Id.
264. Fact Sheet, Europol Drugs Unit (EDU)/the Hague, Oct. 29, 1994, at 1 [here-
inafter EDU Fact Sheet].
265. See supra notes 236-54 and accompanying text (discussing role of Council of
Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs under Maastricht).
266. EDU Fact Sheet, supra note 264, at 1-2. See supra notes 251-54 and accompa-
nying text (discussing role of European Council under Maastricht).
267. EDU Fact Sheet, supra note 264, at 1. Mr. Storbeck was appointed Coordina-
tor on "20/21 June 1994." Id.
268. Council'sJoint Action, supra note 16, art. 5(1), OJ. L 62/1, at 2 (1995). "The
Unit shall be headed by a Coordinator. In addition to the Coordinator, the manage-
ment team shall consist of two Assistant Coordinators and of two other members who
have a direct hierarchical link to the Coordinator. . . ." Id. The management team is
responsible for the EDU's "day-to-day operation." Id.
269. Id. "The Coordinator, the two Assistant Coordinators and the other two
members of the management team shall be appointed by the Council in accordance
with the procedures provided for in Title VI of the Treaty." Id.
270. Id. art. 2(1), O.J. L 62/1, at 1 (1995). Article 2(1) states: "Each Member State
shall send one or more liaison officers to The Hague in order to constitute, with the
liaison officers of the other Member States, a team which will cooperate within the
Unit." Id. "Apart from the liaison officers sent directly by Member States, other staff
shall be posted to the Unit in such numbers as may be agreed by the Council in accord-
ance with the procedures provided for in Title VI of the Treaty." Id. art. 5(2), OJ. L
62/1, at 3 (1995).
271. Id.
272. Id. art. 7, O.J. L 62/1, at 7 (1995). The Liaison Officers and their equipment
are financed by their respective governments. Id. The 1994 budget was ECU 2065
million. EDU Fact Sheet, supra note 264, at 2. The budget allotted by the Council for
1995 is ECU 3710 million. Id.
273. Council's Joint Action, supra note 16, art. 7, OJ. L 62/1, at 3 (1995).
274. EDU Fact Sheet, supra note 264, at 1. See Leonard Doyle, Britain's Drug Crisis:
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and analyzing information and intelligence related to drug and
other contraband trafficking and money laundering. 75 The ob-
ject of the EDU is to provide data and analysis on these activities
to the narcotics squads of the Member States. 76 To achieve in-
ternational cooperation, therefore, the EDU operates as an um-
brella organization2 77 for the Member State's national drug in-
formation units.2 78
The Council's Joint Action document grants the Liaison Of-
ficers the authority to perform two central tasks. 2 7 9 First, the Li-
aison Officers may exchange information between Member
States for investigations of the crimes within the EDU's compe-
Drugs Intelligence Unit Sweeps Into Action, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 3, 1994, at 9 (discussing
EDU's scope of authority).
275. Council'sJoint Action, supra note 16, art. 2(2), O.J. L 62/1, at 1 (1995). Arti-
cle 2(2) provides the EDU's objectives and scope:
2. The Unit shall act as a non-operational team for the exchange and analysis
of information and intelligence, as soon as .they affect two more Member
States, in relation to:
(a) illicit drug trafficking;
(b) illicit trafficking in radioactive and nuclear substances;
(c) crimes involving clandestine immigration networks;
(d) illicit vehicle trafficking;
together with the criminal organizations involved and associated money-laun-
dering activities.
Id.
276. Id. art. 2(3), OJ. L 62/1, at 1 (1995). Article 2(3) of the Council's Joint
Action provides that:
The objective of the Unit is to help the police and other competent agencies
within and between Member States to combat the criminal activities referred
to in paragraph 2 more effectively. For this purpose, members of the Unit,
acting in accordance with their national laws, other relevant legal rules and
any instructions given by their respective Member States, shall perform the
following tasks:
(a) exchange, between Member States, of information (including personal in-
formation) in furtherance of specific criminal investigations concerning the
criminal activities referred to in paragraph 2;
(b) preparation of general situation reports and analyses of criminal activities
on the basis of non-personal information supplied by Member States or from
other sources. The activities of the Unit shall be without prejudice to other
forms of bilateral or multilateral cooperation in combating the criminal activi-
ties referred to in paragraph 2, or to the competencies of the European Com-
munities.
Id.
277. Jim Cusack, Intelligence Agency Will Combat Crime Throughout Europe, husH
TiMES, June 4, 1993, at 2.
278. Id.
279. Council's Joint Action, supra note 16, art. 2(3), OJ. L 62/1, at 1 (1995).
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tence2 "° This data may include specific information about indi-
viduals. 8 ' Second, Liaison Officers may prepare crime analysis
reports from information supplied by Member States and other
sources.2 82 Because these reports are not undertaken for a spe-
cific investigation, however, they may not include the names of
individuals. 3
3. Information Management and Access
The Council's Joint Action document requires the EDU's
Liaison Officers to contribute information relevant to pending
criminal investigations within its authority.284 To facilitate this
information transfer, Liaison Officers are authorized to have ac-
cess to their respective State's criminal data and intelligence. 85
The Liaison Officers' contributions, however, are subject to their
respective States' national legislation and the instructions of
their Ministers. 86
The Council's Joint Action document explicitly addresses
the need to protect information from unauthorized access and
transmittal. 87 To secure the data gathered during an EDU in-
vestigation against unauthorized access, Member States' requests
for information are channeled through a minimal number of
bureaucratic layers.2 88 All exchanges of personal information
between Liaison Officers are subject to the Officers' respective
national laws and requirements regarding the dissemination of
280. Id. art. 2(3)(a), OJ. L 62/1, at 1 (1995).
281. Id. Liaison Officers, "acting in accordance with their national laws, other rel-
evant legal rules and any instructions given by their respective Member States, [may]
(a) exchange... information (including personal information) in furtherance of spe-
cific criminal investigations." Id.
282. Id. art. 2(3)(b), O.J. L 62/1, at 1 (1995).
283. Id. "The activities of the Unit shall be without prejudice to other forms of
bilateral or multilateral cooperation in combating the criminal activities [deliniated in
the agreement], or to the competencies of the European Communities." Id.
284. Id. art. 3(1), O.J. L 62/1, at 2 (1995). See supra notes 275-78 and accompany-
ing text (discussing criminal activity currently within EDU's authority).
285. Council's Joint Action, supra note 16, art. 3(1), O.J. L 62/1, at 2 (1995).
286. Id.
287. Id. art. 4(3), O.J. L 62/1, at 2 (1995). "Member States shall undertake to see
that their liaison officers cooperate fully with their competent national data-protection
authorities." Id.
288. Id. art. 3(2), O.J. L 62/1, at 2 (1995). "Requests for information made to the
Unit by the police or any other competent service shall be channelled through one
national central authority. The latter shall also be responsible for the receipt and the
passing on of any replies supplied by the Unit." Id.
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personal information.289 The information gathered by the deliv-
ering state may also be made available to other Liaison Officers
to whom it is relevant, if to do so would not violate the national
laws of all respective parties. 90 Personal information gathered
pursuant to a Liaison Officer's request, however, may not be
transmitted to non-Member States or other international organi-
zations.291
As additional protection against the unauthorized dissemi-
nation of personal information, Liaison Officers must keep a
record of all information transmitted.2 92 The Council's Joint Ac-
tion document also prohibits the storage of personal informa-
tion in areas of the EDU to which other Liaison Officers have
access, including common databases.295  The authorities respon-
sible for data protection within each Member State supervise
their Liaison Officers' activities to ensure compliance with na-
tional data protection procedures.294
4. Accountability
Although the Liaison Officers must follow the Coordina-
tor's instructions,295 the Officers are currently accountable only
to their respective nations' governments.296 Collectively, the
Ministers function as overseers of the EDU's activities, without
affecting the right of each Minister to control the activities of his
individual Liaison Officers. 7 To facilitate the Ministers' over-
289. Id.
290. Id. art. 4(1), O.J. L 62/1, at 2 (1995). Article 4(1) provides, in relevant part:
Should the delivering State, in the course of dealing with a request, discover
any information in connection with a criminal activity [within its competence]
(2) which is of interest to another Member State, this information may be
made available to that Member State via the liaison officers of the States in-
volved in accordance with their respective national legislation.
Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. art. 4(2), O.J. L 62/1, at 2 (1995).
293. Id.
294. Id. art. 4(3), O.J. L 62/1, at 2-3 (1995).
295. Id. art. 5(1), O.J. L 62/1, at 3 (1995). "The Member States shall instruct their
liaison officers to follow the instructions of the Coordinator, in accordance with their
national legislation .. . ." Id.
296. See id. art. 3(1), O.J. L 62/1, at 2 (1995) (stating Liaison Officers shall com-
municate to EDU headquarters information on criminal activity "in accordance with
their national laws"); id. art. 4(1), O.J. L 62/1, at 2 (1995) (stating each Liaison Officer
shall communicate personal information "in accordance with his national laws").
297. Id. art. 6, O.J. L 62/1, at 3 (1995). Article 6 provides in relevant part that:
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sight function, the Ministerial Agreement instructs the Coordi-
nator to present to the Ministers a bi-annual report on the man-
agement and activities of the EDU. 9 8
5. The EDU's Current Activities
The EDU employs a drug liaison officer from each state who
is permanently stationed at its headquarters. 99 This facilitates
strategic communication among multinational narcotics agen-
cies during investigations and avoids potential language barrier
problems.3 0 0 The EDU's ability to provide immediate tactical in-
formation about targeted individuals and organizations demon-
strates its vital importance in assisting the EU police forces.30 1
Although still not fully operational, Europol's present form,
the EDU, has already contributed to several successful drug
seizure operations.0 2 In the Spring of 1994, for example, the
EDU assisted Greek, Belgian, and French narcotics officers by
providing back-up intelligence data that permitted the officers
to execute their operations successfully.30 3 The EDU's direct
computer links to national police intelligence services allowed it
to provide information to national authorities almost instantane-
ously.30 4
"[wiithout prejudice to the responsibility of each Member State for controlling its na-
tional liaison officers, the Council shall exercise general oversight over the activities of
the Unit." Id.
298. Id. "[T]he Coordinator shall submit a six-monthly written report on his man-
agement and the activities of the Unit. The Coordinator shall also provide any other
report or information for which the Council may ask." Id.
299. Doyle, supra note 274, at 9.
300. Id.
301. Watson, supra note 18, at 680. In addition to its own database, Europol ac-
cesses the database of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
("EMC"), located in Portugal. Id. The EMC focuses on "gathering, processing, and
providing reliable comparable information on the drug phenomenon, drug addiction,
and their consequences." Id. The data the EMC provides will be used by Europol, the
Council of Europe's Pompidou Group, and the United Nations. Id. See supra note 17
and accompanying text (discussing recent successful EDU operations).
302. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing EDU's coordination of
successful contraband seizures).
303. Doyle, supra note 274, at 9. Europol Director Jurgen Storbeck stated that
intelligence information provided by the EDU allowed the officers to execute their op-
eration with "pinpoint accuracy." Id. at 9. Recently, Europol cooperated with Scotland
Yard and police in Spain, France, and Ireland to seize cannabis from an alleged Irish-
based drug trafficking ring. Michael Smith, Customs Raid Smashes Irish Cannabis Ring,
DAILY TEL, July 11, 1995, at 3.
304. Doyle, supra note 274, at 9.
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6. The Europol Convention: The European Union's Most
Recent International Police Cooperation Initiative
The EDU will not expand into a fully operational Europol
unit until the Member States ratify the Europol Convention.30 5
As the President of the European Union from July through De-
cember, 1994, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl sought to com-
plete the Europol Convention in time for the summit of Euro-
pean Union Leaders in Essen in early December, 1994.306 Dur-
ing the meetings in preparation for this summit, however,
disagreement surfaced between Member States over the draft
Europol Convention.30 7 The Europol Convention was ultimately
completed after the Cannes Summit in late July, 1995.308
a. Establishment and Intended Tasks of Europol
Europol's ultimate objective is to improve cooperation
among Member States' competent authorities"0 9 in their efforts
to prevent and combat unlawful drug trafficking,310 terrorism,
and other serious forms of international crime.3 " Initially,
Europol will focus solely on drug trafficking, trafficking in nu-
clear and radioactive substances,3 1 2 illegal immigrant smug-
305. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 45, 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex, at 66.
See EU Criticism of Cannes Focuses on Europol, supra note 15 (noting that Europol Con-
vention will not enter into force until it is ratified by Member States).
306. EU in Disarry [sic] Over Europol Convention, STATEWATCH, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 16.
307. Id.
308. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting Europol Convention com-
pleted after Cannes Summit).
309. See Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(4), 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex, at
10 (defining "competent authorities" as "all public bodies existing in the Member States
which are responsible under national law for preventing and combating criminal of-
fenses").
310. Id. art. 2(5), at 10. "'Unlawful drug trafficking' means the criminal offenses
listed in Article 3(1) of the [Vienna U.N. Drug Convention]." Id.; see vienna U.N. Drug
Convention, supra note 21, art. 3(1), 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26, at 5-6, 28 I.L.M. at 500-
01 (listing proscribed offenses); see supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Vienna U.N. Drug Convention).
311. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 2, 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex, at 8-10.
Europol is to facilitate international cooperation "where there are factual indications
that an organized criminal structure is involved and two or more Member States are
affected ... in such a way as to require a common approach by the Member States
owing to the scale, significance and consequences of the offenses concerned." Id.
312. Id. art. 2(2), at 9. The Europol Convention defines trafficking in nuclear and
radioactive substances as "the criminal offenses listed in Article 7(1) of the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material [March 3, 1980] . . . relating to the
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gling,1 3 trade in human beings,314 and motor vehicle crime."' 5
Within two years after its entry into force, Europol will also deal
with terrorist activities.31 6 Europol's competence extends to
money laundering,317 and other criminal offenses,3 1 8 when it re-
lates to the commission of crimes within Europol's compe-
tence.3 1 9 The Council may also authorize Europol to deal with
any of the crimes specified in the Annex to the Europol Conven-
tion.3 20
Three organs will contribute to Europol's operations: the
National Units located in each Member State, 21 the Liaison Of-
nuclear and/or radioactive materials defined in Article 197 of the Euratom Treaty and
Directive 80/836 Euratom of 15 July 1980." Id. annex at 70.
313. Id. art. 2(2), at 9. The Europol Convention defines "[I]llegal immigrant
smuggling" as "activities intended deliberately to facilitate, for financial gain, the entry
into, residence or employment in the territory of the Member States of the European
Union, contrary to the rules and conditions applicable in the Member States." Id. an-
nex at 70.
314. Id. at art. 2(2), at 9. The Europol Convention defines "Traffic in human be-
ings" as the "subjection of a person to the real and illegal sway of other persons by using
violence or meanaces or by abuse of authority or intrigue with a view to the exploitation
of prostitution, forms of sexual exploitation and assault of minors or trade in aban-
doned children." Id. annex at 71.
315. Id. art. 2(2), at 9.
316. Id. art. 2(2), at 9. Within two years:
Europol shall also deal with crimes committed or likely to be committed in the
course of terrorist activities against life, limb, personal freedom or property.
The Council, acting unanimously in accordance with the procedure laid down
in Tide VI of the Treaty on European Union, may decide to instruct Europol
to deal with such terrorist activities before that period has expired.
Id.
317. Id. art. 2(3)(1), at 9. "'[I] llegal money-laundering means the criminal of-
fences listed in Article 6(1) to (3) of the [ELC]." Id. annex at 71. See supra notes 118-
42 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of ELC).
318. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(3) (2), Europol 54, Rev. 5, Annex, at
9-10. Other offenses include those that are in preparation of, facilitate, or "ensure the
impunity of" crimes within Europol's competence. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. art 2(2), at 9. The crimes listed in the Annex are divided into three cate-
gories. Id. annex at 69-70. The first group covers crimes "[A]gainst life, limb or per-
sonal freedom," which includes violent crimes against the person, illicit trade in human
organs and tissue, and racism and xenophobia. Id. The second group covers crimes
"against property or public goods including fraud". Id. The third group covers "Illegal
trading and harm to the environment." Id. "In addition, in accordance with Article
2(2), the act of instructing Europol to deal with one of the forms of crime listed above
implies that it is also competent to deal with the related money-laundering activities
and the related criminal offenses." Id.
321. Id. art. 4, at 12-13, Article 4 states:
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ficers at Europol's headquarters,32 2 and each Member State's
competent authorities. 2 3 The National Units are to supply in-
formation and intelligence to Europol's headquarters either
upon request or on their own initiative.3 2 4 The National Units
will also transmit information to competent authorities.2 5 As
under the EDU's current structure,2 6 the Liaison Officers will
assist in coordinating the exchange and analysis of information
among Member States' competent authorities. 27 The Liaison
Officers will both forward information from Europol to their re-
spective National Units and provide Europol with information
from their National Units.3 2
8
The Europol Convention grants Europol the authority to
obtain, collate, and analyze information and intelligence and to
coordinate the exchange of this information between Member
States.3 29 Europol will aid Member States' investigations by for-
warding all relevant information to the National Units, where it
will ultimately be forwarded to the State's competent authori-
1. Each Member State shall establish or designate a national unit to carry out
the tasks listed in this Article.
2. The national unit shall be the only liaison body between Europol and the
competent national authorities. Relationships between the national unit and
the competent authorities shall be governed by national law, and, in particular
the relevant national constitutional requirements.
3. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the na-
tional units are able to fulfil their tasks and, in particular, have access to rele-
vant national data.
Id. art. 4(1)-4(3), at 12.
322. Id. art. 5, at 14-15. "Each national unit shall second [sic) at least one liaison
officer to Europol.... The liaison officers shall be instructed by their national units to
represent the interests of the latter within Europol. . . ." Id. art. 5(1)-5(2), at 14.
323. See id. art. 3(1) (3), at 10 (stating that one of Europol's principal tasks is "to
notify the competent authorities of the Member States without delay via the national
units").
324. Id. art. 4(4)(1)-4(4) (2), at 12.
325. Id. art. 4(4)(4), at 12.
326. Council'sJoint Action, supra note 16, art. 1, O.J. L 62/1, at 1 (1995); see supra
notes 279-83 and accompanying text (discussing role of Liaison Officers in EDU struc-
ture).
327. Europol Convention, *supra note 5, art. 5, 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex, at 14-15.
See id. art. 2(4), at 10 (defining "competent authorities" as "all public bodies existing in
the Member States which are responsible under national law for preventing and com-
batting criminal offenses").
328. Id. art. 5(3)(1)-5(3) (2), at 14. The Liaison Officers will cooperate "with offi-
cials of Europol by providing information and giving advice as regards analysis of the
information concerning the seconding Member State." Id. art. 5(3) (3), at 14.
329. Id. art. 3(1), at 10.
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ties."' ° Europol will also provide advice on investigations and
strategic intelligence to maximize the resources of the compe-
tent authorities.3 1 Further, Europol is empowered to provide
training, equipment, and technical and forensic assistance to
Member States' competent authorities.3 2
b. Organizational Structure
Europol's Management Board will have principal authority
over its operations.3 3 The Management Board will be com-
prised of one representative from each Member State."M
Among other responsibilities, the Management Board will deter-
mine Europol's objectives 3 5 and define the Liaison Officer's
rights and obligations.336 This body will resolve disputes either
between a Member State and Europol, or between two Member
States, concerning the compensation paid for unauthorized or
incorrect data processing.33 7 Europol's Director 338 will oversee
the day-to-day administration of Europol's activities, and will be
accountable to the Management Board for his decisions. 3 9
c. Computerized Information System
As one of its primary tools in coordinating international po-
lice cooperation, Europol will establish a three-part computer-
330. Id. art. 3(1)(4), at 11.
331. Id. art. 3(2), at 11. In order to maximize its resources, Europol will become
well acquainted with the investigative procedures of each Member State's competent
authorities. Id. art. 3(2)(1), at 11.
332. Id. art. 3(3), at 11. Providing training and assistance to Member States' com-
petent authorities will be "in accordance with its staffing and the budgetary resources at
[Europol's] disposal and within the limits set by the Management Board." Id.
333. See id. art. 28, at 48-51 (detailing Europol Management Board's authority over
operations).
334. Id. art. 28(2), at 50.
335. Id. art. 28(1)(1), at 48.
336. Id. art. 28(1) (2), at 48. The Management Board will also unanimously deter-
mine the number of Liaison Officers Member States send to Europol headquarters. Id.
art. 28(1)(3), at 48.
337. Id. art. 28(1) (21), at 50. The Management Board "shall act by a two-thirds
majority in disputes between a Member State and Europol or between Member States
concerning compensation paid under the liability for unauthorized or incorrect
processing of data." Id.
338. See id. art. 29, at 51-52 (defining role of Europol's Director). Two Deputy
Directors will assist the Director in Europol's daily administration. Id. art. 29(2), at 51.
The Director will define the roles of the Deputy Directors. Id.
339. Id. art. 29, at 51-52.
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ized system of information processing.A4 The system will in-
clude a Europol information system,3 41 analysis work files, 3 42 and
an index system for each. 43 Access to the Europol information
system will be limited to the National Units, the Liaison Officers,
and Europol's Management Board. '  The text of the Conven-
tion does not grant access to Member States' competent authori-
ties. 45
The Europol information system may only contain data re-
lating to persons suspected of having committed or who are con-
sidered likely to commit an offense within Europol's compe-
tence 4.3 1 The Europol Convention imposes restrictions on the
kinds of personal data that may be entered regarding such per-
sons.3 4 7 Only the unit that entered an individual's personal data
may make deletions, modifications, or corrections. 34 The infor-
mation system may also be used to enter a detailed account of a
targeted person's criminal history, including his or her sus-
pected membership in any criminal organizations.3 49  In the lat-
340. Id. arts. 7-9, at 17-21.
341. See id. arts. 7-8, at 17-20 (establishing and defining contents of computerized
information system that will be used by Liaison Officers, National Units, and manage-
ment).
342. Id. arts. 10-12, at 22-28. Europol's Management Board must approve the
opening of every data analysis file that contains personal data. Id. art. 12(1), at 27-28.
"If the urgency of the matter is such as to preclude obtaining the approval of the Man-
agement Board" the Director may order the opening of a data file "on his own initiative
or at the request of the Member States concerned." Id. art. 12(2), at 28.
343. Id. art. 11, at 26-27.
344. Id. art. 7(1), at 17. The information system allows "Member States, repre-
sented by their national units and liaison officers, [to] directly input data in compliance
with their national procedures, and [allows) Europol [to] directly input data supplied
by third bodies and States and analysis data." Id. "Data may be retrieved where this is
necessary for the performance of Europol's tasks in a particular case; retrieval shall be
effected in accordance with the laws, regulations, administrative provisions and proce-
dures of the retrieving unit, subject to any additional provisions contained in this Con-
vention." Id. art. 9(1), at 20.
345. See id. art. 7(1), at 17 (failing to grant access to Member State's competent
authorities).
346. Id. art. 8(1)(1) - 8(1)(2), at 18.
347. Id. arts. 8(2)-(3), at 19-20. Personal data may only include: names and ali-
ases; date and place of birth; nationality; gender; and "where necessary, other character-
istics likely to assist in identification, including any specific objective physical character-
istics not subject to change." Id. art. 8(2) (5), at 19. "If proceedings against the person
concerned are dropped or if that person is acquitted, the data relating to either deci-
sion shall be deleted." Id. art. 8(5), at 20.
348. Id. art. 9(2), at 21.
349. Id. art. 8(3), at 19-20. This information system may also include information
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ter circumstance, any unit may add information.350
The analysis work files combine, for specific analysis,35' the
information contained in the Europol information system with
other types of information. 5 2 Liaison Officers, Europol data
analysts, and experts from Member States will staff each analysis
project.3 53 Data from the National Units may be routed directly
to these analysis groups,354 depending on its sensitivity.3 5 5 Euro-
pol may also request information from groups outside the Euro-
pol structure, such as EU bodies, Interpol, and other intergov-
ernmental organizations.3 56  Analysis that has a direct opera-
tional aim and bears on a specific case, but does not concern all
Member States, is accessible only by those Member States with an
interest therein.3 57 By contrast, non-specific crime analysis strat-
egies are accessible to all Member States. 58
d. Information Processing Provisions
The Europol Convention obligates Europol to transmit all
information on criminal activity to the relevant Member States'
National Units and Liaison Officers. 59 The Convention details
the procedures governing the exchange of information. 60  The
Member State supplying the information is responsible for its
on criminal activity where no suspect has been identified: "These data may also be
input when they do not yet contain any reference to persons." Id.
350. See id. art. 9(2), at 21 (stating that "any unit may enter [nonpersonal] data").
351. Id. art. 10(1)(1) - 10(1)(5), at 22. The data analysis files will combine the
information in the Europol Information System with: information on persons who
might be called upon to testify in investigations; "persons who have been the victims of
one of the offenses under consideration or with regard to whom certain facts give rea-
son for believing that they could be the victims of such an offence;" contacts and associ-
ates; and other persons who can provide information relevant to an investigation. Id.
352. Id. arts. 10, 12, at 22-28. Analysis is defined as "the assembly, processing or
utilization of data with the aim of helping a criminal investigation." Id. art. 10(2), at 23.
353. Id. art. 10(2), at 23.
354. Id. art. 10(3), at 23-24.
355. Id. art. 10(8), at 26. "The Member State communicating an item of data to
Europol shall be the sole judge of the degree of its sensitivity .... " Id.
356. Id. art. 10(4), at 24. Europol "may also... accept information provided by
those various bodies on their own initiative." Id.
357. Id. art. 10(6), at 25. A Member State's Liaison Officer will be granted auto-
matic access to analysis bearing on a specific case upon written request, which must be
approved by-the analysis group. Id. art. 10(7), at 25.
358. Id. art. 10(6), at 25.
359. Id. art. 13, at 29.
360. See id. arts. 14-25, at 29-46 (detailing procedures for exchange of informa-
tion).
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security.3 61 Before the Convention enters into force, each Mem-
ber State must have enacted domestic legislation that ensures
the adequate protection 62 of personal data.63 A Member State
may not communicate personal data until the Member State has
achieved this standard. 64  The Europol Convention also re-
quires each Member State to create aNational Supervisory Body,
which is to independently monitor the Member State's contribu-
tions of personal information.36 3 The National Supervisory Body
will ensure that all Member State contributions of data to the
Europol information system are in compliance with their na-
'tional data protection legislation. 6 6
e. Liability and Legal Protection
Pursuant to the Europol Convention, Member States' liabil-
ity for damages caused by legal or factual errors in data stored or
processed by Europol will be determined in accordance with
their national laws. 67 Europol itself will also be liable if it devi-
ates from its prescribed procedures.368 'The Europol Convention
grants Europol's agents, management, and employees immunity
from personal liability when acting in performance of their du-
ties.3 69
361. Id. art. 15(1), at 30. Europol is responsible for the security of "data communi-
cated to Europol by third parties or which result from analyses conducted by Europol."
Id. art. 15(1)(2), at 30.
362. Id. art. 14(1), at 29.
363. See supra notes 347 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of personal
data under Europol Convention).
364. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 14(2), 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex, at
30.
865. Id. art. 23, at 41-42. The Europol Convention also requires Member States to
set up a joint supervisory board, which is to review the acts of Europol "to ensure that
the rights of the individual are not violated by the storage, processing and utilization of
the data held by Europol." Id. art. 24(1), at 42.
366. Id. art. 23(1), at 41.
367. Id. art. 38(1), at 61. Only the Member State where the damage occurred is
liable: "A Member State may not plead. that another Member State had transmitted
inaccurate data in order to avoid its liability under its national legislation .... " Id.
368. Id. art. 38(2), at 61.
369. Id. art. 41, at 63. A Protocol will set out "the rules to be applied in all Mem-
ber States and the particular rules to be applied in the headquarters State, including
the rules for family members." Id.
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f. Dispute Settlement: Extent of European Court of
Justice Jurisdiction
The Europol Convention does not definitively prescribe the
forum for resolving disputes between Member States on the in-
terpretation or application of the Convention. ° Specifically,
Member States were unable to resolve the issue of whether the
European Court ofJustice should have jurisdiction over disputes
involving Europol. 371 Article 40(2) provides that Member States
who are parties to a dispute must determine among themselves
the forum in which the dispute will be resolved . 72 With the ex-
ception of Great Britain, all Member States have agreed to sys-
tematically submit these disputes to the European Court of Jus-
tice.3 7 3
II. IMPEDIMENTS TO RATHICATION THE DEBATE OVER
THE PROPER SCOPE OF EUROPOL 'S POWER
Despite its ongoing contributions to international law en-
forcement, the EDU's scope of operations is limited.3 74 There
are a number of areas of disagreement that may delay the ratifi-
cation of the Europol Convention. 75 Perhaps the most conten-
tious area is whether the European Court of Justice will have ju-
370. See id. art. 40(1), at 63. Article 40(1) states that disputes between Member
States "shall in an initial stage be discussed by the Council in accordance with the pro-
cedure set out in Title VI of.the Treaty on European Union with the aim of finding a
settlement." Id.
371. See Eurapol Convention Signed but Still to be Ratified, supra note 5 (noting that
unresolved issue of role of European Court of Justice may impede ratification); No
Cannes Do, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 57 (stating that Council members agreed to
sign Europol Convention, but reserved decision on role of European Court of Justice
until next year).
372. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 40(2), 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex, at
63.
373. Id. Declarations, art. 40(2), at 73.
374. Alister Bull, Europol Strains at Leash as Politicians Wrangle, Europol Drugs Unit
/ Reuters Press Notice, Reuters News Service, Jan. 9, 1995, at 1. Director Storbeck
notes that while the EDU's staff has "already answered hundreds of calls for aid and
facilitated dozens of international operations that would otherwise have been strangled
by official bureaucracy," it still lacks the technical and legal powers to fulfill its poten-
tial. Id. For example, as ofJanuary 1995, the EDU lacked a central database and access
to national police data. Id.
375. See No Cannes Do, supra note 371, at 57 (noting failure to resolve issue of
jurisdiction of European Court ofJustice may prevent ratification of Convention); Rob-
ertson, supra note 164, at 115 (discussing issues raised by creation of centralized
database); Monica den Boer, Europe and the Art of International Police Co-operation: Free
Fall or Measured Scenario?. in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 279, 289 (David
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risdiction over Europol's activities.376 The creation of a central-
ized database raises two interrelated problems. 77 First, there is
concern over Member States' ability to control and access the
information housed in Europol's database. 78 Second, the use of
this information raises personal privacy concerns for EU citi-
zens. 3 7  There is further debate over the accountability of the
Liaison Officers and National Units." °
A. Europol's Integration into the EU's Constitutional Structure
The current Europol Convention does not resolve the ques-
tion of whether the European Court of Justice will have jurisdic-
tion over Europol. sl While Great Britain continues to oppose
granting the Court jurisdiction, however, every other Member
State has agreed to systematically submit disputes among them-
selves to the Court.3 8 2 The Council of Ministers of Justice and
Home Affairs agreed to set aside this issue until the next Euro-
pean Council Summit in the summer of 1996.83 In so doing,
the Council declined to resolve the vexing problem of the extent
to which EU institutions have competence over international po-
O'Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1994) [hereinafter Europe and the Art of International
Police Co-operation] (discussing issue of accountability of Europol's agents).
376. See No Cannes Do, supra note 371, at 57 (stating Council members agreed to
sign Europol Convention, but reserved decision on role of European Court of Justice
until next year); Emma Tucker, EU Police Agency Plans Deadlocked: Britain Resists Power of
European Court to Interpret Convention in Case of Disputes, FIN. TIMES, June 21, 1995, at 3
(discussing deadlock at Cannes Summit over role of European Court of Justice).
377. See Robertson, supra note 164, at 115 (discussing issue of Member States' abil-
ity to control access to sensitive information); European Community Moves Towards the
Establishment of a European Police Force (EUROPOL), 9 INr'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 52, 52
(1993) (discussing personal privacy issues raised by centralized database).
378. Robertson, supra note 164, at 115.
379. European Community Moves Towards the Establishment of European Police Force
(EUROPOL), supra note 377, at 52.
380. Europe and the Art of International Police Co-operation, supra note 375, at 289.
381. See supra note 370 and accompanying text (discussing dispute resolution pro-
visions under Article 40(1)).
382. See Limited Summit Success Leaves Large Workload Ahead, European Insight, June
30, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Aliwid File (stating that British Prime Minis-
terJohn Major was immovable in his objections to European Court ofJustice'sjurisdic-
tion).
383. See No Cannes Do, supra note 371, at 57 (stating Council agreed to address
issue of European Court of Justice in June, 1996); Limited Summit Success Leaves Large
Workload Ahead, supra note 382 (stating issue of role of European Court of Justice de-
ferred until June, 1996, European Council).
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lice cooperation efforts.38 4
Many argue that Europol should not be governed by EU leg-
islation. 8 5 Member States are divided over the extent to which
Europol must consult the European Parliament prior to making
important decisions. 86 Some Member States consider Article
K6 8 7 of the Maastricht Treaty to encompass Europol's obliga-
tion to Parliament.388 Other Member States favor specifying the
type of Parliamentary oversight that is to exist.389
'Pursuant to the Europol Convention, the President of the
Council is to forward to the European Parliament an annual re-
port detailing Europol's activities.3 90 The Council must also con-
sult Parliament before the Council may amend the Europol Con-
vention.391 Because the Council's prerogatives under the Euro-
pol Convention, however, are subject to Article K.6 of the
Maastricht Treaty,3 9 2 the Council must also ensure that the views
of Parliament are duly taken into consideration.
384. See Europe and the Art of International Police Cooperation, supra note 375, at 288-
89 (discussing how issue of international monitoring of cross-border policing remains
unresolved). See also No Cannes Do, supra note 371, at 57 (noting Council failed to
resolve issue of European Court ofJustice); Limited Summit Success Leaves Large Workload
Ahead, supra note 382 (stating Council deferred until June, 1996, European Council
issue of role of European Court of Justice).
385. Schutte, supra note 27, at 64; Walker, supra note 247, at 30.
386. EU in Disarry [sic] Over Europol Convention, supra note 306, at 17.
387. TEU, supra note 1, art. K6, O.J. C 224/1, at 98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
737.
388. Id. art. K6, O.J. C 224/1, at 98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 737. Article KI6
of the TEU states:
The Presidency and the Commission shall regularly inform the European Par-
liament of discussions [about Europol's policies]. The Presidency shall con-
sult the European Parliament on the principal aspects of activities [of Euro-
pol] and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken
into consideration. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Coun-
cil or make recommendations to it. Each year, it shall hold a debate on the
progress made in implementing [Europol].
Id.; see EU in Disarry [sic] Over Europol Convention, supra note 306, at 17.
389. EU in Disary [sic] Over Europol Convention, supra note 306, at 17.
390. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 34, 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex, at 57.
391. Id.
392. Id. art. 34(3), at 57.
The obligations laid down in this Article shall be without prejudice to the
rights of national parliaments, to Article K6 of the Treaty on European Union
and to the general principles applicable to the, relations with the European
Parliament pursuant to Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.
Id.
393. TEU, supra note 1, art. I-6, OJ. C 224/1, at 98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
737. "The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommen-
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1. Arguments in Favor of The European Court of Justice's
Institutional Competence
The Maastricht Treaty granted EU institutions power over
several areas that had formerly been under the exclusive control
of Member States' national governments. 94 Some argue that
Maastricht created a closer link between the areas of justice and
home affairs 95 and the mainstream institutional framework of
the EU. 96 In addition to a symbolic recognition that interna-
tional crime requires international police cooperation, Maas-
tricht's the provisions attempt to formalize and coordinate vari-
ous initiatives..97
In this sense, Maastricht represents a convergence of previ-
ously divergent areas of concern within the European Union.3 98
For example, the informal Trevi Group structure 99 has been re-
placed by the Council of Ministers of Justice and Home Af-
fairs.40 ' Further, the European Parliament recommended in its
1993 Report4 0 that it and the national parliaments be inten-
sively involved in deciding the objectives, powers and instru-
dation to it. Each year, it shall hold a debate on the progress made in implementation
of the areas referred to in this Title." Id.
394. Debrouwer, supra note 251, at 84. Criminaljustice is one of "the policy areas
that ha[s] always been connected with national culture and on which the different and
typically national legal concepts, systems, traditions and sensitivities have left, and con-
tinue to leave, their imprint." Id.
395. See supra notes 236-54 and accompanying text (discussing areas covered by
justice and home affairs).
396. Walker, supra note 247, at 29. Policy on visas for third-party nationals is
brought explicitly within the legislative competence of the Community. TEU, supra
note 1, art. 100(c), OJ. C 224/1, at 32 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 634.
397. den Boer, supra note 18, at 9.
398. Id. Under one view, "international police cooperation may be understood as
a policy-making process which interacts directly with the wider context of European
integration, that is, first, political and legal concepts of federalism and potential 'trans-
fer of sovereignty' to supranational bodies, and second, the concept of Europe's inter-
nal security." Europe and the Art of International Police Cooperation, supra note 375, at 279.
399. See supra notes 162-87 and accompanying text (discussing Trevi Group struc-
ture).
400. den Boer, supra note 18, at 9; see TEU, supra note 1, art. K.3(2), O.J. C 224/1,
at 97 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 736. (discussing Council's authority). Article K.4 of
the Convention establishes Coordinating Committees within the Council to facilitate
the Council's work. Id. art. K4, OJ, C 224/1, at 98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 736.
The Coordinating Committee "shall give opinions for the attention of the Council,
either at the Council's request or on its own initiative" and contribute to the prepara-
tion of the Council's discussions. Id.
401. European Community Moves Towards Establishment of a European Police Force
(EUROPOL), supra note 377, at 52-56 (citing Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties and
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ments of Europol and the European information system. 4° The
Report suggests that Europol must be governed by EU legisla-
tion, rather than by the laws of individual national legislatures,
and that it be supervised by the European Court of Justice.4 °3
The Maastricht's provisions lead some to conclude that,
eventually, Europol and related criminal justice initiatives may
be governed by EU law and institutions.4 Maastricht commits
Members States to regard, as matters of common interest, their
policies on immigration, asylum, external borders, and strategies
to combat international fraud and drug addiction.4 °5 Some ar-
gue that cooperation will facilitate the systematic regulation in
areas previously governed solely by intergovernmental agree-
ments. 40 6 Maastricht can be seen, therefore, as representing the
foundation that may eventually lead to institutional competence
in criminal justice matters.4 7 As one commentator observes,
Maastricht, combined with the proliferation of police coopera-
tion initiatives," 8 provides evidence of a momentum towards
permitting EU institutions to play a greater role in international
police cooperation matters.40 9
2. Arguments Against Institutional Competence
The integration of international police cooperation into the
Internal Affairs on the Setting Up of Europol, Eur. Parl. (A3-0382/92 Doc
EN\RR\217877.WPS PE 202.364/fin. Or.NL 26 November 1992)).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 56. The European Court ofJustice may have to create a special internal
Europol section. Id.
404. See Walker, supra note 247, at 28 (stating Europol may provide foundations
for system of vertical integration in form of supranational police facility with power to
operate through European Union).
405. Id. at 29.
406. Id.
407. Europe and the Art of International Police Co-operation, supra note 375, at 282.
Under one view:
The move towards integrating the fields of International Co-operation in Jus-
tice and Home Affairs into the institutional clockwork of the EC may be read
as a political manifestation of the growing willingness to link crime and crimi-
nal justice issues with other issues on the European agenda, such as health,
education, employment and migration.
Id.
408. Id. at 280. In an analogous situation, the Committee on Civil Liberties and
Public Affairs considered the European Court of Justice to be the appropriate body to
interpret the Schengen Convention. Id.
409. Id.
EUROPOL
scope of Justice and Home Affairs may demonstrate a momen-
tum towards EU institutional competence over Europol. 410 Ac-
ceptance of this proposition, however, does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that it is currently appropriate to subject Euro-
pol to the European Court ofJustice's jurisdiction.41 Thus, crit-
ics argue that although Maastricht empowered EU institutions to
create Europol, Europol will not be fully integrated within the
constitutional structure of the EU because these institutions lack
both legislative and judicial competence in criminal justice mat-
ters.4 12 Critics of institutional competence argue that European
criminal justice cooperation, including the coordination of in-
vestigative operations and prosecutions, the techniques used to
gather and produce evidence, and the determination of criminal
sanction objectives does not lend itself well to standardized regu-
lation through EU law.4" 3 Standardized regulation fails to allow
for exercising discretion and also fails to accommodate Member
States' varying legal principles and practices.4" 4
One international criminal law expert argues that simply ap-
plying the national law of the place where the event in question
occurred will not overcome all of the difficulties of international
cooperation.41 Other unresolved substantive and procedural is-
sues will remain,4"' including: the substantive issues surround-
ing the disparity among nations' definitions of categories of of-
fenses417 and the procedural difficulties surrounding the treat-
ment and processing of offenders, the use of coercive measures,
410. Id.
411. See, e.g., id. at 282-84 (noting that slow evolutionary process towards institu-
tional competence in matters of criminal justice implies that EU institutions are not
presently competent).
412. Walker, supra note 247, at 30. While the European Union may acquire legis-
lative competence over most areas ofjustice and home affairs, "this does not apply to
police cooperation, or... to judicial cooperation in criminal matters or customs coop-
eration." Id. at 41.
413. Schutte, supra note 27, at 69.
414 Id. As of 1990, for example, the Netherlands, Spain, and Denmark had insuf-
ficiently stringent money laundering statutes, particularly with regard to the duties of
financial institutions to know their customers. Kochinke, supra note 127, at 51. Italy,
because it had only criminalized the laundering of funds derived from extortion and
ransom, experienced widespread abuse of its financial institutions laws. Id. Finally,
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland lacked money laundering statutes entirely. Id.
415. European Community Moves Towards Establishment of European Police Force (EURO-
POL), supra note 377, at 52, 56.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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and the methods of collecting information. 41 8
Moreover, European Court of Justice precedent may indi-
cate that the Community is not competent to govern interna-
tional cooperation in criminal matters.419 In 1978, the Euro-
pean Court held that the European Community ("EC") institu-
tions were incompetent to carry out those aspects of a EC-wide
treaty concerning international criminal cooperation. 420 In rul-
ing on the division of authority between the Community and the
Member States, the Court held that the treaty's criminal law pro-
visions rested with the Member States alone.42 1
B. Access to Europol Database
1. Member States' Ability to Access and Control Data
There are benefits and drawbacks associated with transmit-
ting information to and from Europol headquarters. 22 Officers
in each country must weigh the costs of keeping information
under their nation's exclusive control in order to protect its con-
fidentiality against the benefits of contributing such information
to a database that other nations may access in order to facilitate
423 Ecooperation. The Europol Convention's provisions address
both Europol's need for the open exchange of information and
the Member State's need for data security.
4 24
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. In re Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Ruling of 14 November 1978 pursuant to Arti-
cle 103 of the EAEC Treaty, [1978] E.C.R. 2151, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 131. See Schutte,
supra note 27, at 64 (discussing European Court of Justice precedent); see supra notes
33-49 and accompanying text (discussing EU institutions).
421. Schutte, supra note 27, at 64. Each Member State was responsible for taking
measures to comply with the Convention "for its own territory, regarding deployment
of police forces, initiation of criminal proceedings, and extradition." Id.
422. Robertson, supra note 164, at 115.
423. Id. As one commentator explains:
Individual officers in each country are unlikely to have sufficient information
to calculate the costs of keeping information under their control or passing it
to [Europol headquarters]. The difficulties of making a rational calculation
are going to be compounded by the organizational distance involved. Assess-
ing the costs involved in losing control over information becomes more diffi-
cult as one moves from the team, to station, division, force, regional or na-
tional unit. Such difficulties are compounded when an extra layer, in the
form of a European agency, is added.
Id.
424. See Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 10, 54 Europol, Rev. 5, Annex, at
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The Europol Convention articulates standards for data ex-
change and security.425 Pursuant to Europol Convention, each
National Unit is obligated to supply Europol, either upon re-
quest or upon its own initiative, with all information relevant to
Europol's activities.42 6 Member States commit themselves to fa-
cilitating the National Units' information exchange responsibili-
ties.427 Under the terms of the Europol Convention, however, a
Member State may withhold information from Europol when
the Member State's national security interests outweigh Euro-
pol's interest in receiving information from the State's National
Units. 4
28
When Europol's analysis is of a general nature, all Liaison
Officers and National Units may access it.a29 When information
relates to a specific investigative operation, however, the Europol
Convention restricts access to the Member States who entered
the information and the Member States to whom it is relevant.430
22-26 (establishing procedures for information exchange and data protection). Na-
tional intelligence on terrorism is a primary example of the tension between Europol's
need for full exchange of information, and Member States' need to retain control over
access to such information. David Gardner, EU State Divided on Europol Police Force Plan,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at 2. Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, and the
Netherlands have favored restricting access to sensitive information on terrorist groups
to prevent their national police forces from losing control of their most sensitive opera-
tions. Id. These Member States insisted on restricting access to sensitive information
for security reasons, except where the requesting liaison Officer is directly involved in
the matter. Euroservice Factsheet on Europol, May 12, 1994, at 2; EU in Disarny [sic] over
Europol Convention, supra note 306, at 16. In contrast, France opposed restrictions on
access to the Liaison Officers, advocating that the Officers should have access to all
Europol information. Id. Euroservice Factsheet on Europol, May 12, 1994, at 2. Access
to Europol information would extend to intelligence information, including sensitive
data possibly compiled by a another country. EU in Disarry [sic] over Eurapol Convention,
supra note 306, at 16. See id. (noting that complete access to Europol's information
would facilitate Member States' efforts to counter terrorism).
425. Europol Convention, supra note 5, arts. 9-25, Europol 54, Rev. 5, Annex, at
20-46 (outlining procedures for data entry, storage, processing, and analysis).
426. Id. art. 4(4), at 12-13.
427. Id. art. 4(5), at 13.
428. Id. National Units may decline to provide certain information to Europol if it
would mean "(1) harming essential national security interests; or (2) jeopardizing the
success of a current investigation or the safety of individuals; (3) involving information
pertaining to organizations or specific intelligence activities in the field of State secur-
ity." Id. The Europol Convention also allows a National Unit to decline to contribute
information where it would compromise "the maintenance of law and order and the
safeguarding of internal security." Id. (citing TEU, art. K.2(2), O.J. C 224/1, at 97
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 736).
429. Id. art. 10(6), at 25.
430. Id.
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A Liaison Officer will automatically gain access to the informa-
tion via written requests to all participants in the analysis pro-
ject.4"' If a member of the analysis project objects to a certain
Liaison Officer having access to the information, automatic ac-
cess will be deferred until either the two parties or the Manage-
ment Board resolve the conflict.4 2
The data control procedures embodied in the Europol Con-
vention ensure that Member States will not lose control over sen-
sitive information.43 3 Because each contributing party has ple-
nary discretion as to its degree of sensitivity, the party contribut-
ing the information is able to bar other nations' Liaison Officers
from access.43 4 Despite the suggestions of some Member States,
the Convention's drafters declined to create a system that would
permit Liaison Officers to have access to Europol information
on a need-to-know basis. Under this proposal, Europol would
decide what information will be distributed to whom.43 5 If Euro-
pol's operating procedures did not include the present veto
power, National Units would arguably be reluctant to transmit
information that they know will be time sensitive and highly valu-
able.43 6 Moreover, while the latter control system would address
security concerns, it would also risk alienating the suppliers of
information, because the suppliers would only receive informa-
tion from Europol when Europol considers it necessary.43 7 Euro-
pol, therefore, needed to strike the difficult balance between
maximizing the flow of information to the center while restrict-
ing dissemination from the center. 38
431. Id. art. 10(7), at 25-26.
432. Id.
433. Robertson, supra note 164, at 115.
434. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 10(8), Europol 54, Rev. 5, Annex, at
26.
435. Id.
436. Id. A related issue involves the question of who determines what information
is relevant and, therefore, important enough to be transmitted:
If it is the operational units in each country then the centre will only get what
each country thinks is worth collecting rather than what the analysts require.
If, on the other hand, Europol can task each country to collect the informa-
tion which it requires[] this will create competition for resources between
Europol and national agencies.
Id. at 116.
437. Id.
438. Robertson, supra note 164, at 116. One commentator explains that "[it is
difficult to believe that Europol can be an effective intelligence system unless it [incor-
2. Data Protection for the Individual: Personal Privacy
In 1993, the European Parliament expressed concern that
Europol's provisions may infringe upon personal privacy and lib-
erties.4 39 The Parliament Report states that Europol must en-
sure respect for individual privacy and procedural guarantees in
its gathering, processing, and communicating of information.'
The Report seeks to compel each Member State to create legal
consequences for the unlawful or improper divulsion of per-
sonal data by the police or judicial authorities." 1 The Report
also recommends that Europol comply with the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and that it recognize all of the rights
upheld by the European Court ofJustice. 42 Further, the precise
meaning of information that Europol would be authorized to
provide must be established to prevent the unauthorized trans-
mittal of sensitive data.44 3
Under the Europol Convention, the exchange of data must
be in accordance with the national laws of the contributing and
receiving states. 4 Europol is obligated to take measures to pro-
vide for data protection. 445 Any individual has the right to re-
quest access the data about himself stored at Europol. 44  The
individual may make such a request to his national competent
authorities, and Europol must respond to it within three
months:" 7
There are, however, significant limitations on one's right to
porates] strict security procedures; but security measures will create tensions between
countries as to how, when, and to whom, information will be distributed." Id.
439. European Community Moves Towards Establishment of a European Police Force
(EUROPOL), supra note 377, at 52.
440. Id. The information gathered and exchanged for use in a prosecution must
be obtained legally. Id. Further, judicial authority must have the ability to review the
methods employed to obtain the information. Id. The Report recommends that, upon
judicial request, Europol be required to disclose the source of information. Id.
441. Id. The Report recommends that an investigated person be given notice and
opportunity to intervene, as well as have access to all relevant information. Id. The
investigated person must also be able to monitor the further collection of information.
Id. at 53.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(2), 5(2), Europol 54, Rev. 5, Annex,
at 9, 14.
445. Id. art. 25, at 44-46.
446. Id. art. 19(1), at 34.
447. Id. art. 19(2), at 34.
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access data relating to oneself.18 For example, Europol may
deny an individual's request if disclosure would prevent Europol
from performing its duties properly," 9 would compromise a
Member State's national security interests,45 ° or would jeopard-
ize the rights of third parties.451 Moreover, before Europol can
grant an individual's request, any Member State to whom the
information is of interest may intercede to prevent its disclo-
sure.45 2 An individual may reverse Europol's decision by appeal
to the Joint Supervisory Body.45 If Europol or a Member State
makes persistent objections to the disclosure, however, the joint
supervisory board may only overrule the objections by a two-
thirds vote.454
C. Accountability
Commentators conclude that, because EU institutions have
limited authority overJustice and Home Affairs matters, 455 Euro-
pol will be subject to adequate scrutiny and control456 only by
relying on national accountability mechanisms. 457 National ac-
countability standards and procedures, however, are considered
to be widely disparate. 458 The accession of Austria, Finland, and
Sweden to the European Union may only exacerbate this dispar-
ity.459 Europol's accountability is also suspect because Europol
448. See id. art. 19(3),(4), at 35-36 (discussing right of individual to access data
relating to that individual).
449. Id. art. 19(3)(1), at 35.
450. Id. art. 19(3)(2), at 35.
451. Id. art. 19(3)(3), at 35.
452. Id. art. 19(4), at 35-36.
453. Id. art. 19(7), at 36-37.
454. Id.
455. See supra notes 236-54 and accompanying text (discussing EU institutions'
role under TEU Article K).
456. den Boer, supra note 18, at 13.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 14. The European Union will become more heterogeneous with the
accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Id. One commentator observes that, in
particular, the inclusion of the Scandinavian States will intensify the north-south divide:
[I]n Southern Europe there is a predominantly repressive approach with a
high tolerance vis-a-vis information-exchange and police cooperation, while in
Northern Europe, a more professional and differentiated approach prevails.
Nordic states may also introduce scenario's [sic] for improved accountability,
[and] more intensive working relationships between police and prosecution
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was created by the Trevi Group, which has minimal democratic
accountability procedures. 460
Accountability under the Europol Convention is divided be-
tween the Member States and Europol itself."1 One potentially
unsettled area concerns citizens' rights to access the data that
Europol enters about them."2 The Europol Convention grants
Europol wide latitude over whether to grant a citizen's request to
access the data relating to him.46 These provisions may conflict
with the authority of the National Supervisory Body464 and the
Joint Supervisory Body," 5 which was designed to ensure that the
rights of the data subject are not violated.I From the provi-
sions of the Europol Convention, it is unclear which authority
would control in a given case."6
III. THE EUROPOL CONVENTION WILL FACILITATE
EFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION AMONG
EU MEMBER STATES
Europol will be a workable and effective mechanism for
countering international crime within the European Union.
Although many regard inconsistencies among Member States'
criminal legislation as an obstacle to Europol's potential effec-
tiveness, previous international police cooperation efforts have
460. Benyon, supra note 108, at 62; see supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text
(discussing Trevi Group's lack of accountability mechanisms).
461. See Europol Convention, supra note 5, arts. 2(2), 5(2), 28, Europol 54, Rev. 5,
Annex, at 9, 14, 48-58. Articles 2(2) and 5(2) subject the actions of Europol Liaison
Officers and National Units to national law. Id. arts. 2(2), 5(2), at 9, 14. In compari-
son, Article 28 gives Europol's management final decision-making power in selected
areas. Id. art. 28, at 48-50.
462. See supra notes 359-66, 433-38 and accompanying text (discussing Europol
Convention's personal privacy and data protection provisions).
463. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 19(1), Europol 54, Rev. 5, Annex, at
34.
464. See supra note 448-54 and accompanying text (discussing right of citizens to
access data relating to them).
465. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 25, Europol 54, Rev. 2, Annex, at 44-
46.
466. Id. arts. 23(1), 24(1), at 41, 42. The task of the Independent Joint Supervi-
sory Body is to "review[ 1, in accordance with this Convention, the activities of Europol
in order to ensure that the rights of the individual are not violated by the storage,
processing and utilization of the data held by Europol." Id. art. 24(1), at 42.
467. Compare id. art. 19(7), at 36-38 (requiring two-thirds majority to overrule
Europol's objections to data disclosure) with id. arts. 23(1), 24(1), at 41-42 (installing
supervisory bodies to ensure that entry and use of data does not infringe on rights of
individual).
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largely overcome this concern. Moreover, Europol constitutes
both a necessary complement and desirable alternative to ex-
isting international police cooperation initiatives. It is not yet
appropriate, however, for EU institutions to oversee Europol's
activities. Member States, therefore, should ratify the Europol
Convention only if it grants Member States more authority to
monitor Europol's activities.
A. Existing Initiatives Overcome the Obstacles that Inharmonious
Domestic Criminal Legislation Present to Effective
International Cooperation
The disparity among Member States' national criminal laws
is commonly cited as an impediment to greater international po-
lice cooperation.6 8 Member States, however, participate in a
number of initiatives specifically intended to harmonize their
criminal law.469 These initiatives are an important supplement
to Maastricht's efforts to facilitate centralized policing.470
The Vienna U.N. Drug Convention facilitates the harmoni-
zation of the signatories' domestic criminal laws by requiring all
signatories to criminalize money laundering and drug trafficking
through appropriate domestic legislation.471 This Convention
also requires the forfeiture of assets procured from drug traffick-
ing and the prohibition of drug money laundering.17 2 Further,
the Convention calls for mutual assistance in carrying out its pro-
visions.473
468. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (noting difficulties of successful
law enforcement in international law context because of disparate legal systems among
nations).
469. See Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26,
28 I.L.M. 493 (establishing internationally recognized offenses relating to drug traffick-
ing that are to be criminalized under signatories' domestic laws); ELC, supra note 24,
Europ. T.S. No. 141, 30 I.L.M. 148 (obligating signatories to criminalize money laun-
dering); EC Money Laundering Directive, supra note 24, O.J. L 166/77 (1991) (requir-
ing Member States to criminalize money laundering as defined in Vienna U.N. Drug
Convention).
470. Walker, supra note 247, at 31.
471. Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, art. 3, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
26, at 5-7, 28 I.L.M. at 500-03.
472. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing Vienna U.N. Con-
vention's asset forfeiture and money laundering provisions).
473. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (discussing Vienna U.N. Con-
vention's mutual legal assistance provisions). In addition to its domestic legislation re-
quirement, the Vienna U.N. Drug Convention strongly encourages its signatories to
enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements that strengthen international coopera-
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The ELC also facilitates the harmonization of Member
States criminal law by building upon the Vienna U.N. Drug Con-
vention4 7 4 and criminalizing all money laundering activity."' As
with the Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, the ELC provides that
domestic bank secrecy laws shall not prevent international coop-
eration.4 76 Finally, the EC Money Laundering Directive requires
Member States to comply with their obligations under the Vi-
enna U.N. Drug Convention and the ELC.477 These initiatives
seek to achieve international police cooperation through their
legal harmonization provisions. Finally, the Schengen Conven-
tion47' requires signatories to develop common policies on the
granting of visas,4 79 asylum, 480 and police cooperation measures
to compensate for the abolition of border controls within the
Schengen territory.48 1
tion. Vienna U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 21, art. 5(4) (g), 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
26, at 9, 28 I.L.M. at 506.
474. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (comparing money laundering
provisions of ELC and Vienna U.N. Drug Convention).
475. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting that ELC is more compre-
hensive because signatories are more homogeneous than those of Vienna U.N. Drug
Convention).
476. ELC, supra note 24, Europ. T.S. No. 141, 30 I.L.M. 148. Although, as its name
implies, the ELC focuses on money laundering, the impact on drug trafficking is obvi-
ous: with nowhere to divert the money derived from drug trafficking, traffickers will
lose the economic incentive to continue the activity. See Zagaris & Castilla, supra note
74, at 871 (noting that anti-money laundering regimes were created to counter interna-
tional drug trafficking).
477. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (discussing EC Money Laun-
dering Directive).
478. See supra notes 188-235 and accompanying text (discussing Schengen Conven-
tion).
479. Schengen Convention, supra note 20, art. 9, 30 I.L.M. at 89. Article 9 states:
"The Contracting Parties undertake to adopt a common policy on the movement of
persons and in particular on the arrangements for visas. They shall give each other
assistance to that end. The Contracting Parties undertake to pursue by common agree-
ment the harmonization of their policies on visas." Id.; see id. arts. 10-18, 30 I.L.M. at
89-91 (detailing particulars of visa arrangements under Schengen Convention).
480. See id. Joint Statement on National Asylum Policies, 30 I.L.M. at 145. "Con-
tracting Parties shall make an inventory of national asylum policies with a view to the
harmonization thereof." Id.
481. See supra notes 201-14 (discussing Schengen Convention's criminal law har-
monization provisions). One commentator states that "[t]he international criminal law
elements of the Schengen Convention are significant because the Convention enhances
procedural aspects of cooperation while simultaneously enhancing cooperation in se-
lected substantive areas, such as drugs, terrorism, and illegal firearms and ammuni-
tion." Bruce Zagaris, Schengen Convention Points Way to Enhanced EC Criminal Cooperation,
7 INrr'L ENioacmR Nw L. REP. 26, 26 (1991).
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B. Europol is a Desirable Alternative and Necessary Complement to
Existing International Police Cooperation Initiatives
The ratification of the Europol Convention is a desirable
alternative and necessary complement to existing police cooper-
ation initiatives.48 2 While most EU officials and commentators
advocate limiting Europol's powers solely to providing informa-
tion and analysis to domestic police agencies, 483 German Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl continues to advocate of granting Europol
immediate authority to conduct investigations within the terri-
tory of the Member States.484 This debate raises the question of
whether existing international police cooperation initiatives are
adequately performing Europol's intended functions.48 5
Although existing international police cooperation organiza-
tions certainly play a role in countering international crime
within the European Union, Europol will be a more effective in-
ternational police cooperation mechanism.486
In responding to the needs of the European Union, Euro-
482. den Boer, supra note 18, at 6-7. The accession of Austria, Finland, and Swe-
den to the European Union increases the need for effective police cooperation. Id. at
14. These States create new external frontiers for the European Union, which in turn
presents new criminal opportunity structures. Id. One example of a new criminal op-
portunity is the availability of vast areas which can be used for environmental dumping.
Id. at 15.
While these States' accession may pose new challenges for Europol, there are ar-
guably three benefits. Id. 15-16. First, because of their unique geographic position,
Nordic countries have had substantial experience with common operational cross-bor-
der policing. Id. at 16. Second, the high level of harmonization among Nordic states'
criminal justice systems could serve as a model for the rest of the European Union. Id.
Third, the extensive accountability of Nordic police forces may serve as a useful model
for the rest of the European Union and for Europol. Id.
483. Id.
484. German Minister Wants Official Creation of Europol Before Year's End, Agence
France Presse, Sept. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
485. See den Boer, supra note 18, at 6 (comparing Europol to Trevi Group and
Interpol).
486. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text (discussing Interpol's efforts to
address specific needs of European Union). It appears that one commentator, who has
highlighted some foreseeable difficulties with the creation of Europol, does not regard
the difficulties as insurmountable: "The enormous problems of organized crime and
illegal migration demand that there be a Community police force to ensure the integ-
rity of the market and compensate for the increased opportunities for criminals that
result from elimination of the barriers of the movement of persons, goods, and capital."
European Community Moves Towards Establishment of European Police Force (EUROPOL),
supra note 377, at 57.
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pol will be more effective than Interpol487 because Europol's
members are more homogenous and able to respond more
quickly to investigation requests.4 s8  Moreover, disparities in the
efficiency of national law enforcement agencies and the neces-
sity of translating information into many other languages ham-
per Interpol's investigatory effectiveness 9.4 8  These problems
have resulted in significant delays in the transmission of re-
quested information.49 ° Europol will operate more efficiently,
despite some disparity in the quality of services, because similar
infrastructures and technical resources are available to Member
States' Liaison Officers. 491
Europol is a desirable alternative to the Trevi Group be-
cause the Europol Convention, in addition to empowering Euro-
pol to address policy-making issues,492 also focuses on opera-
tional policing activities.493 Some observers criticize Trevi for
failing to focus adequately on the practice of policing.49 4 The
Europol Convention's provisions allow Europol to both focus on
international criminal law enforcement policy49 5 and assist Mem-
487. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text (discussing structure and activi-
ties of Interpol).
488. den Boer, supra note 18, at 677.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. den Boer notes that European complaints about Interpol have lessened
since the Interpol Headquarters in Lyons instituted two technical advances. Id. First,
the Automated Message Switch System ("AMSS"), created in 1987, processes about one
million messages per year. Id. This is particularly important for Europe: the informa-
tion-exchange between European countries accounts for eighty percent of Interpol's
message traffic. Id. Second, the Automated Search Facility ("ASF"), created in 1992,
allows Interpol "to control information which is entered into the computerized
database and to control who has access to it, granting or denying access to any other
member country." Id.
One commentator, however, notes that Interpol's regulations do not address polit-
ical and public accountability. Benyon, supra note 108, at 56-57. Although this is not
presently problematic because Interpol functions primarily as a means of communica-
tion, "if Interpol were to assume a greater role in police cooperation in Europe much
consideration would need to be given to the incorporation of structures to increase
accountability and hence legitimacy and public consent." Id.
492. See Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 3(3), Europol 54, Rev. 5 Annex, at
11 (empowering Europol to assist Member States in policy development through advice
and research)
493. Id. art. 3(1)-(2), at 10-11. See den Boer, supra note 18, at 7 (noting Trevi
Group's emphasis on policy issues); see supra notes 161-83 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Trevi Group's policy-oriented approach).
494. den Boer, supra note 18, at 7.
495. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 2(3), Europol 54, Rev 5, Annex at 11
306 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:247
ber States in their active criminal investigations.496 Thus, by
working with Member States' National Units and competent au-
thorities, the Liaison Officers at Europol headquarters will be
able to concentrate on both concrete and theoretical aspects of
international police cooperation.497
Europol will also serve as a valuable complement to Member
States' existing initiatives. While the Schengen Convention4 98
permits the exercise of modest operational powers within the
territory of fellow signatories,499 it does not establish a central
location from which cross-border crime developments can be
monitored.5 0 0 Europol can fill this void, with the help of the
National Drug Units in the Member States, by acting as a central
data exchange and analysis center.5 0
Maastricht °2 provides a link between various security issues,
including asylum policy, external border controls, immigration
policy, drug addiction, fraud, judicial cooperation in criminal
and civil matters, customs cooperation and police coopera-
tion.505 Maastricht specifically authorizes Europol's creation. 0 4
Europol, therefore, arises out of a supranational political infra-
structure in a way that Interpol and Schengen do not, thereby
acting as a point of convergence for the coordination of these
security concerns. 5 5 Thus, Europol will provide cohesion and
(authorizing Europol to cooperate with Member States in developing international po-
lice cooperation policies).
496. See supra notes 309-32 and accompanying text (discussing Europol's authority
to contribute to Member States' criminal investigations).
497. den Boer, supra note 18, at 7.
498. See supra notes 188-229 and accompanying text (discussing Schengen Conven-
tion).
499. See supra notes 201-14 and accompanying text (discussing cross-border opera-
tion powers under Schengen Convention).
500. den Boer, supra note 18, at 7-8 (noting that provisions of Schengen Conven-
tion do not provide for data analysis headquarters).
501. Id. at 7. Whereas the Schengen Convention provides for "horizontal" cross-
border police cooperation, Europol provides the "vertical component." Id.
502. TEU, supra note 1, art. K1(9), O.J. C 225/1, at 97 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 735. See supra notes 236-54 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Maas-
tricht Treaty).
503. TEU, supra note 1, art. K1(1)-(9), OJ. C 225/1, at 97 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 735. See den Boer, supra note 18, at 8 (discussing Maastricht's police coop-
eration aspects); Debrouwer, supra note 247, at 85 (noting Maastricht brings police
cooperation closer to EU institutional framework).
504. TEU, supra note 1, art. KI (9), O.J. C 225/1, at 97 (1992); (1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 735.
505. Debrouwer, supra note 247, at 86.
EUROPOL
structure to the various cross-border law enforcement initiatives
in the European Union.
C. Member States Should Ratify the Europol Convention Only If It
Grants Member States More Authority to Monitor Europol's Activities
With the text of the Europol Convention finalized, the Jus-
tice and Home Affairs Ministers must present it to their Member
States for ratification."°6 EU institutions are not presently com-
petent to oversee Europol's activities, and therefore, the Europol
Convention should not give jurisdiction to the European Court
of Justice. Rather, while EU institutions should continue to ex-
pand their role in criminal justice matters, the Europol Conven-
tion should grant Member States primary oversight over Euro-
pol's activities. 0 7 Consequently, without institutional oversight,
the Europol Convention should make Europol more accounta-
ble to Member States than the Convention presently provides.50 8
Such an arraignment would be consistent with the current struc-
ture of the EDU.509
The present text of the Europol Conventions falls short,
however, of adequately ensuring that citizens have access to their
own personal information.51 0 The relationship between Euro-
pol's ability to deny citizens' rights to access to information and
the Supervisory Bodies' authority to protect these rights is un-
clear.5 1' The right to access data must be enforced through a
strong National Supervisory Board system. If these agencies are
not able to carry out their functions, Europol's legitimacy with
the public could be damaged. Indeed, national accountability
will prevent a chasm from opening between law enforcement
and the public. 12 Further, in the event that information about a
506. See supra notes 236-54, 390-409 (discussing EU institutional power in area of
Justice and Home Affairs).
507. See supra notes 394-421 and accompanying text (discussing debate over EU
institutional competence in criminal justice matters).
508. See supra notes 439-67 and accompanying text (discussing accountability, and
proposals for personal privacy protection).
509. See supra notes 274-83 (discussing EDU Liaison Officers' responsibilities and
limitations under Council's Joint Action document).
510. See supra notes 367-73, 455-67 and accompanying text (discussing accountabil-
ity provisions under Europol Convention).
511. See supra notes 461-67 and accompanying text (discussing shared oversight
authority between Supervisory Boards and Management Board under Europol Conven-
tion).
512. den Boer, supra note 18, at 19. This commentator explains that:
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citizen is entered by a Member State other than his own, a na-
tion's domestic data protection measures may fall short of pro-
viding an adequate safeguard against invasions of privacy. This,
therefore, also increases the need for a strong Joint Supervisory
Body.5 1 3
CONCLUSION
The Europol Convention presents a workable and effective
mechanism to counter international crime within the European
Union. Since EU institutions are not competent. to oversee
Europol's activities, the Europol Convention should empower
Member States to assume the primary oversight role. In doing
so, Member States will ensure that the Europol Convention
strikes the necessary balance between achieving effective interna-
tional police cooperation and ensuring that citizens' rights are
adequately protected.
[T] he larger the distance between [the] policing unit and the public, the less
control the public is able to exercise over the police. Interaction between
police and public is essential, and the police.., need the public to give them
information. What should therefore be avoided is that the police become
alienated: otherwise the social legitimacy of policing becomes problematic as
a result of the lack of social control. The lack of adequate control of Euro-
pean policing could be problematic.
Id. at 19-20.
513. See supra notes 340-66 and accompanying text (discussing multiple sources of
information contained in Europol databases).
